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Russia's Systemic Transformations since
Perestroika: From Totalitarianism to
Authoritarianism to Democracy—to Fascism?
Alexander J. Motyl
Introduction
All the post-Communist states of the former Soviet 
empire have experienced significant change in the last 
twenty years, but Russia's systemic transformations since 
Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika may be most dramatic. 
Most of the East Central European satellite states and 
the Baltic republics moved from some from of decayed 
totalitarianism through generally brief interludes of 
authoritarianism to democracy—and have stayed there. 
Serbia, Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, and Ukraine had 
longer authoritarian interludes, but in the end appear to 
have adopted democratic forms of government. Belarus, 
Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan ended their transitions at different stages of 
authoritarianism; Turkmenistan has arguably remained 
totalitarian; and Kyrgyzstan rushed toward democracy, 
but then fell back to a weak form of authoritarianism.
In contrast to the above, Russia passed from 
totalitarianism to several years of both authoritarianism 
and democracy—only to abandon democracy completely 
and embark on a transition to what is arguably fascism. 
In using this term, I am suggesting both the magnitude of 
Russia's change in recent years and the direction in which 
it has changed. No less important, I am also suggesting 
that the terms scholars have developed for Russia— 
such as patrimonial or tsarist—are inadequate, primarily 
because they fail to place Russia on a spectrum of 
comparative political-system types. This paper therefore 
examines fascism as a system type within a typology of 
political systems. It also suggests why Vladimir Putin's 
Russia has enough of the defining characteristics of 
fascism to qualify as fascistoid—that is, as moving 
toward fascism—and why Russia alone moved along so 
exceptionally turbulent a systemic path. Finally, the paper 
examines whether a fascistoid or fascist Russia is likely 
to be stable.1
A fi nal point about political sensibilities needs 
making. Fascism is often used as an epithet, especially 
by the left, but it actually is, or at least can be, a perfectly 
respectable social-science term that refers to a particular
1. Many thanks to Michael Bernhard, Thomas Bernstein, Yitzhak 
Brudny, Richard Langhorne, Jerzy Mackow, Rajan Menon, and George
Schopflin for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
type of political system. Some Russians may find it 
objectionable that their country, which waged the “Great 
Patriotic War” against fascism, should now be called 
fascist. That is certainly an irony of history, but there 
is no reason that such a reversal of roles should not be 
possible. Democracies (such as Weimar Germany) can 
become dictatorships, and dictatorships (such as Franco 
Spain) can become democracies. If today's Russia 
approximates the definition of fascism, then the fault 
surely lies, not with the scholars who use the term, but 
with the politicians who made it usable.2
Systems and System Types
Social scientists have since Plato and Aristotle 
characterized countries or states according to their 
dominant features, as only such an exercise permits 
them to engage in comparisons and produce theoretical 
generalizations. A political system—a term that I shall, 
despite their conceptual differences, use interchangeably 
with state in this paper—consists of those characteristics 
that define the politics, broadly conceived, of a country.3 
Those characteristics concern established institutions, 
structures, relations, and attitudes—and not individuals 
or policies. The disassociation of policies from systems 
means that, for instance, democratic systems may conduct 
non-democratic policies and still be democratic systems, 
while authoritarian systems may pursue democratic 
policies and still be authoritarian systems.
The system types that social scientists employ are 
ideal types: that is, few countries or states ever match 
all their requirements exactly. No less important, system 
types, however plausible they may seem at a macro level, 
always break down upon closer inspection of the myriad 
details that comprise the real life of real societies and real 
countries. In other words, system typologies are useful 
only at a fairly high, and thus abstract, level of generality 
(and it is small wonder that they rarely appeal to social
2. There have been self-styled Russian fascists in the twentieth century. 
See John Stephan, The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 
1925-1945 (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).
3. For extended discussions of political systems, see Anton Bebler and
Jim Seroka, eds., Contemporary Political Systems (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 1990).
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historians, anthropologists, and other scholars similarly 
inclined to examine micro events4). But because system 
types are at such a high level of generality, they enable 
us to outline the contours of systems, trace how they 
are changing, and suggest, however imperfectly, just 
what their future trajectories are likely to be. Plato thus 
argues that his ideal republic will eventually break down, 
while Aristotle believes that democracy as he defines it 
necessarily results in dictatorship. There is no “correct” 
typology or classification. Typologies and classifications 
are “good” as long as they are internally consistent and 
theoretically fruitful.
The three dominant system types encountered in 
modern social-science literature are totalitarianism, 
authoritarianism, and democracy, which differ, to put it 
over-simply, from one another in the degree to which the 
ruling authorities exert control and the society enjoys 
political and economic freedom. Totalitarian systems 
are most controlling and their populations enjoy least 
freedom; democratic systems are least controlling and 
their populations enjoy most freedom; and authoritarian 
systems are somewhere between the two. Obviously, there 
is no system that exerts total control over everything, 
just as there is no system that is perfectly democratic— 
which may mean, ironically, that authoritarianism is the 
least ideal of the system types. Soviet studies employed 
all three categories until about the mid-1960s, when 
totalitarianism was, in an excessive fit of social-historical 
revisionism, consigned to the ash heap of history. It was 
only in the mid- to-late-1980s that totalitarianism again 
became respectable among western Sovietologists, in no 
small measure because Soviet analysts began reviving 
it in order to understand the impact of Gorbachev's 
perestroika on the USSR.5
The systemic types, and their features, that I employ 
in this paper are presented in table 1 (see page 12). 
The categories of totalitarianism, authoritarianism, and 
democracy are relatively straightforward and, I trust, 
uncontroversial and require no further elaboration. The 
fifth column, however, which describes the features of 
fascism, does require a closer look, if only because there 
is little scholarly consensus on what fascism is.6 It is 
important to appreciate that this condition of disagreement 
is hardly unique to fascism. Scholars have yet to find 
common and uncontroversial definitions for any number 
of terms—from state to totalitarianism to culture to 
genocide to revolution to democracy. We still use them,
4. See R.J.B. Bosworth, Mussolini's Italy: Life under the Fascist
Dictatorship, 1915-1945 (New York: Penguin, 2006), p. 566.
5. Giovanni Sartori, “Totalitarianism, Model Mania and Learning from 
Error,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 5, no. 1, 1993, pp. 5-22.
6. For an indication of the diversity of views, see Adrian Lyttelton,
“What Was Fascism?” New York Review of Books, vol. 51, no. 16,
October 21, 2004; Antonio Costa Pinto, “Back to European Fascism,” 
Contemporary European History, vol. 15, no. 1, 2006, pp. 103-115.
because they strike us as important; and we can use them 
well, if we define them well. Others may disagree, but that 
is their prerogative. Obviously, if unanimity of meaning 
were a precondition of a term's being used, then social 
science would cease activity immediately.
Fascism as a Political System
Let us start our investigation of fascism by examining 
five definitions, which nicely illustrate both the diversity 
of opinions and approaches regarding fascism and the 
weaknesses of existing definitions.
• Juan Linz defines fascism as “a hypernationalist, 
often pan-nationalist, anti-parliamentary, anti­
liberal, anti-communist, populist and therefore 
anti-proletarian, partly anti-capitalist and anti­
bourgeois, anti-clerical, or at least, non-clerical 
movement, with the aim of national social 
integration through a single party and corporative 
representation not always equally emphasized; 
with a distinctive style and rhetoric, it relied on 
activist cadres ready for violent action combined 
with electoral participation to gain power with 
totalitarian goals by a combination of legal 
and violent tactics. The ideology and above 
all the rhetoric appeals for the incorporation of 
a national cultural tradition selectively in the 
new synthesis in response to new social classes, 
new social and economic problems, and with 
new organizational conceptions of mobilization 
and participation, differentiate them from 
conservative parties.”7
• According to Robert O. Paxton, “Fascism may 
be defined as a form of political behavior marked 
by obsessive preoccupation with community 
decline, humiliation, or victim-hood and by 
compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, 
in which a mass-based party of committed 
nationalist militants, working in uneasy but 
effective collaboration with traditional elite 
groups, abandons democratic liberties and 
pursues with redemptive violence and without 
ethical or legal restraints goals of internal 
cleansing and external expansion.”8
• Michael Mann says that “fascism is the pursuit 
of a transcendent and cleansing nation-statism
7. Juan J. Linz, “Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism 
in Sociological Historical Perspective,” in Walter Laqueur, ed., 
Fascism: A Reader's Guide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1976), pp. 12-13.





• Stanley G. Payne writes that “fascism may 
be defined as a form of revolutionary ultra­
nationalism for national rebirth that is based 
on a primarily vitalist philosophy, is structured 
on extreme elitism, mass mobilization, and the 
Fuhrerprinzip, positively values violence as end 
as well as means and tends to normalize war 
and/or the military virtues.”10
• According to Roger Scruton, “Fascism is 
characterized by the following features (not 
all of which need to be present in any of its 
recognized instances): nationalism; hostility to 
democracy, to egalitarianism, and to the values 
of the liberal enlightenment; the cult of the 
leader, and admiration for his special qualities; a 
respect for collective organization, and a love of 
the symbols associated with it, such as uniforms, 
parades, and army discipline.”11
Linz's and Paxton's definitions are, in reality, historically- 
grounded descriptions of movements, and not definitions 
of a system type. Although Linz has a point in emphasizing 
the “anti” character of fascism—if only because the 
definition of any object necessarily entails stating what 
it is not—he underplays the no less important part of 
any definitional exercise—stating what an object is. 
Paxton is surely right to suggest that fascism is a “form 
of political behavior” (what is not a form of political 
behavior?), but that form appears to be primarily rooted 
in a psychological condition characterized by obsessive 
and compensatory attitudes and only secondarily in 
political phenomena. Mann's definition actually is a 
definition, but its emphasis on “pursuit” reduces fascism 
to an activity with a set of goals—a characterization 
that, like Paxton's, applies to most human endeavors 
and has the effect of removing fascism from the realm of 
movements or regimes or systems or, for that matter, even 
politics. Like Mann, Payne provides an actual definition, 
but his differs from the others in reducing fascism to an 
ideology—ultra-nationalism—which tells us little about 
fascism as a system of rule. Scruton's is a list of family 
characteristics that sidesteps the question of whether 
fascism is an ideology, movement, or system, but it does 
have the advantage of being pithy and clear.
Despite these definitional difficulties and
9. Michael Mann, Fascists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), p. 13.
10. Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), p. 14.
11. Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought (New York:
Harper & Row, 1982), p. 169.
disagreements, it is noteworthy that Payne's and Scruton's 
defining characteristics overlap, while also resonating 
with many of the points made by Linz, Mann, and 
Paxton. All five scholars more or less agree that fascism 
is hyper-nationalist; anti-democratic; elitist; leader- 
centered; mass-oriented or collectivist; and vitalist. They 
disagree about violence and mass mobilization, with 
Payne and Paxton regarding both as central, and Scruton 
disregarding the former altogether and only hinting at the 
latter with his reference to collective organization and 
parades. Note also their points of disagreement with Linz. 
Payne, Paxton, Mann, and Scruton say nothing about 
fascism's supposedly anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois, anti­
communist, or anti-proletarian qualities.
These definitions point to three conclusions. First, 
we need to differentiate between fascist systems and 
fascist movements. Although they may share similar 
ideological goals and aspirations, political systems are 
established sets of institutions, structures, relations, and 
attitudes, while movements are mass organizations that 
are “on the move.” Since fascist movements are far more 
numerous than fascist systems, most scholars defining 
fascism are actually defining fascist movements and 
not fascist systems.12 But, obviously, there is no reason 
for the two political formations to share the same exact 
characteristics. Violence and mass mobilization, for 
instance, can easily be defining features of movements, 
especially of revolutionary movements committed to 
overthrowing an established order. Indeed, one could 
argue that such movements, whether on the right or on 
the left, have to be violent and have to mobilize their 
followers if they want to achieve their goals. Systems, 
in contrast, even highly repressive systems, generally 
employ violence and mass mobilization only in spurts, 
if only because violence and mobilization are, by their 
very nature, too disruptive of the institutionalized quality 
of all systems, even repressive ones. Thus, Stalin's, 
Hitler's, and Mao Zedong's versions of totalitarianism 
employed violence and mobilized populations only at 
particular times. Eventually terror and mobilization had 
to be reined in, because they threatened to destroy their 
initiators and upend institution-building. In that sense, 
real totalitarianism is totalitarianism without terror and 
without mass mobilization—or what the Soviet Union 
and China became after, respectively, Stalin's death and 
the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
Second, we must appreciate that why fascist systems 
emerge is a question of causality and that the origins of 
things should not be confused with the characteristics, 
or definitions, of those things. In other words, it is 
perfectly possible for similar or identical fascist systems 
to be “caused” by different factors at different times. The
12. See Ernst Nolte, Die faschistischen Bewegungen (Munich: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1966).
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“anti” qualities emphasized by Linz reflect the historical 
origins of inter-war fascisms and tell us more about 
causation than about system type. There is thus no reason 
to expect early-twenty-first century fascisms to have the 
same causes as twentieth-century fascisms. Just as there 
are many causes of nationalism, war, revolution, empire, 
and so on, so too there may be many causes of fascism.
And third, we need to dissociate the particular 
characteristics of particular historical fascisms from the 
defining characteristics of fascism as a system type. In 
the first case, there is no need to be especially rigorous 
about how systemic categories vary across systems (such 
as totalitarianism, authoritarianism, democracy, and 
fascism) because the focus is on some country at some 
time; in the latter case, that kind of rigorous, controlled, 
cross-systemic comparison is the very point of the whole 
exercise. We cannot expect every example of fascism 
to be identical in every single respect to every other 
example of fascism. Nor should we think that every 
case of fascism must be identical to the Italian variant.13 
(Surely, fascist leaders need not all be named Benito 
Mussolini, and fascists need not speak Italian.) Our 
goal should be to grasp those defining and associated 
features of fascism that define it on its own terms and in 
relation to other system types. And that means that we 
can only define fascism as a system type in comparison 
to other political system types, such as totalitarianism, 
authoritarianism, and democracy. It is only through a 
sustained and rigorous across-the-board comparison of 
the defining characteristics of these systems that we can 
begin to distinguish fascism from the others and get a 
better grasp of what it is. Table 1 attempts to do just that.
Totalitarianism, Authoritarianism, 
and Fascism
Unlike democracies, fascist systems lack meaningful 
parliaments, judiciaries, parties, political contestation, 
and elections. The key word here is meaningful: in fascist 
systems, as in all authoritarian or totalitarian systems, 
parliaments are rubber-stamp institutions, judiciaries 
do what the leader tells them, opposition parties are 
marginal, and electoral outcomes are preordained. Unlike 
totalitarian states, fascist states do not penetrate into every 
dimension of a country's political, economic, social, and 
cultural life; fascist states do not propound all-embracing
13. Consider Zeev Sternhell's comment: “Fascism in power was 
something to which fascist parties made remarkably different 
contributions, depending on the country concerned. Every country 
where there was a fascist party had peculiarities duly reflected in its 
local political organizations; nevertheless, where a so-called fascist 
regime came into being, these national features usually became even 
more exaggerated. Thus movements have much more in common than 
regimes.” (“Fascist Ideology,” in Laqueur, Fascism A Reader's Guide, 
p. 318.)
ideologies that purport to answer all of life's questions. 
Instead, like all authoritarian states, fascist states attempt 
only to influence and control these dimensions of life and 
they prefer to espouse limited worldviews.
Like authoritarian systems, fascist systems are 
highly centralized and hierarchical, they give pride 
of place within the authority structure to soldiers and 
policemen, usually secret policemen, and they always 
have a domineering party that, in contrast to the single 
hegemonic party of totalitarian systems, may tolerate 
other parties but that, in contrast to the dominant parties 
characteristic of authoritarian systems, brooks no 
interference in its running of the political system. Like 
authoritarian states, fascist states limit freedom of the 
press, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly. Like 
authoritarian states, fascist states also reject socialism 
and embrace capitalism—which means that they tacitly 
acknowledge private property and the autonomy of 
capitalists. But this autonomy is circumscribed by 
substantial state intervention—ranging from simple 
dirigisme to occupation of the strategic heights to 
corporatism. And like authoritarian states, fascist states 
generally espouse some form of hyper-nationalism 
glorifying their nation and its fabulous past, present, and 
future. But fascist states also go further than authoritarian 
states in fetishizing the state and its glory and power.
Like totalitarian systems, fascist systems always 
have a supreme leader enjoying cult-like status. Run- 
of-the-mill authoritarian states typically connote images 
of dour old men ruling a sullen population. Totalitarian 
states generally connote images of wise patriarchs. 
Fascist leaders, in contrast, exude vigor and want to 
appear youthful, manly, and active. These qualities of 
hyper-masculinity are most starkly evident in such fascist 
and fascistoid leaders as Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, 
Juan Peron, and Hugo Chavez, but they are lacking in 
such totalitarian and authoritarian autocrats as Joseph 
Stalin, Francisco Franco, Augusto Pinochet, Nicolae 
Ceausescu, or the Ayatollah Khomeini. A fascist leader 
may, like Mussolini, fit the historical stereotype and be 
hyper-masculine and histrionic or, like Putin, he may not 
and instead be hyper-masculine and cool.14
Fascist leaders also evoke and appeal to vitalism and 
vigor in the population and usually coopt the young into 
their movements or parties. No less important, fascist 
states are popular and they always implicate the population 
in its own repression. Fascist states incorporate the 
population into the system of rule, promising it a grand 
and glorious future in exchange for its enthusiasm and 
support. Fascist leaders are especially popular, presenting 
themselves as the embodiments of a nation's best
14. This point does raise the question of whether fascist leaders can be 
women and, if so, just what sort of leader style they would have to 
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qualities and as the only hopes for its future. It is small 
wonder, therefore, that fascist and totalitarian systems are 
often characterized by parades and flag-waving. (Russia's 
decision in January 2008 to revive the May 9th military 
parades on Red Square was therefore quite significant.) 
But pace Scruton, parades are not defining characteristics 
of either system—indeed, it would be bizarre if something 
that ephemeral were—but associated characteristics of 
such systems' populist nature.
The above similarities to and differences from 
totalitarianism and authoritarianism suggest that we 
may hazard a definition. I therefore define fascism as a
non-democratic, non-socialist political system with a 
domineering party, a supreme leader, a hyper-masculine
leader cult, a hyper-nationalist, statist ideology, and an 
enthusiastically supportive population.15 *The elements
15. Note how similar this definition is to one developed by Payne in
1980, when he concluded Fascism: Comparison and Definition 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), p. 211, with a list of 
the “key features” that “reemerge in radical movements and national
of the typology in table 1 that are not found in my 
definition—such as pro-regime movement, police/army, 
media/society, and violence—can be dealt with in one 
of three complementary ways. The presence of a pro­
regime movement, the prominence of police and army 
cadres, and the employment of violence may be more 
appropriately considered the defining characteristics 
of fascist movements that are carried over into fascist 
systems. Alternatively, these elements may be considered 
associated characteristics that can logically be derived 
from the central defining characteristics. Thus, the quality
authoritarian regimes in later times and other regions, even the the 
profile of the new groups is on balance distinct from the generic 
European fascicsms.” These features are: “(1) permanent nationalistic 
one-party authoritarianism, neither temporary nor a prelude to 
internationalism; (2) the charasmatic leadership principle, incorporated 
by many communist and other regimes as well; (3) the search for a 
synthetic ethnicist ideology, distinct from liberalism and Marxism; (4) 
an authoritarian state system and political economy of corporatism or 
syndicalism or partial socialism, more limited and pluralistic than the 
communist model; (5) the philosophical principle of voluntaristic 
activism, unbounded by any philosophical determinism.”
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of being non-democratic implies some dominance by the 
army and police, the domination by the state of the media 
and society, and the willingness to employ violence. And 
a leader cult combined with popular support implies 
a pro-leader movement. Last, as already noted above, 
violence—whether selective or widespread—may be 
considered a policy stance and not a system characteristic, 
a claim that clearly contradicts the view that war is the 
“essence” of fascism.
As this definition suggests, fascism appears to 
share some characteristics of totalitarianism and some 
of authoritarianism. Like totalitarian systems, fascist 
systems have cults of the leader, enjoy widespread 
popular support, and have pro-regime movements. Like 
authoritarian systems, fascist systems have dominant 
parties, rigged elections, and rubber-stamp parliaments, 
promote ideologies of statism and hyper-nationalism, 
control market economies, incorporate the army and secret 
police within the ruling elite, and dominate the media 
and society. At the same time, fascism differs from both 
totalitarianism and from authoritarianism in significant 
ways. By virtue of being non-socialist, fascist systems 
will always fall short of fully totalitarian systems. And 
by virtue of having hyper-masculine cults of supreme 
leaders and domineering parties, fascist systems differ 
from authoritarian systems.
Is fascism therefore a separate system type? Is it a 
cross-between authoritarianism and totalitarianism? Is it 
a peculiar form of authoritarianism—one with a specific 
type of leader, leader cult, and party? Or is it a peculiar 
form of totalitarianism—one without socialist aspirations? 
There is no correct answer to these questions. I treat 
fascism as a separate system type, but one could just as 
easily adopt any of the alternatives.16 Scholars yearning 
for certitude will be unhappy with this conclusion and 
may decide that conceptual clarity is therefore pointless, 
but they would be failing to appreciate that all theorizing, 
while unavoidably linked to and enriched by conceptual 
distinctions, is also, and always, limited by those same 
distinctions.
Russia's Systemic Transformations
Russia has experienced at least three systemic 
transformations in the last two decades. It moved from 
totalitarianism to authoritarianism in the late 1980s and 
from authoritarianism to democracy in the early 1990s. 
It then remained a weakly democratic state until the 
early 2000s, when, under President Putin's tutelage, it 
began to move toward fascism—a process that, for all 
its progress, has not yet culminated in a full-fledged,
16. One difference is clear, however: namely, that fascism, at least as I 
have defined it, is necessarily different from communist totalitarian­
ism.
consolidated fascism. As I suggest later in this paper, a 
fourth transformation may soon be in store, as fascism 
contains within it several disintegrative tendencies that 
are likely to produce system breakdown in the not too 
distant future.
The story begins in 1985, when Gorbachev became 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union. The country had just emerged from over three 
decades of post-Stalinist change. State terror had been 
abandoned in the early 1950s, but the system of total 
control built by Stalin remained essentially in place.17 That 
it began to malfunction seriously by the 1970s bespoke a 
weakening, or decay, of the totalitarian system, but not 
its replacement by something else.18 Totalitarianism's 
decay appears to have been the inevitable consequence 
of over-centralization; totalitarianism's collapse, as Karl 
Deutsch suggested in the 1950s, would probably have 
been inevitable as well.19 What Gorbachev effectively did 
by introducing glasnost and perestroika was to determine 
the timing of that collapse
Perestroika aimed to revive the Soviet Union but 
succeeded in liberating the media and society from 
total Party domination, destroying the centrally planned 
economy and Communist Party hegemony, and ushering 
in, by 1989-1990, an unstable authoritarian system of 
rule in the USSR. The Party remained the dominant 
force even after its constitutionally-enshrined “leading 
role” was abandoned in early 1990, although the 1989 
elections to the Congress of People's Deputies and the 
1990 elections to the republic Supreme Soviets were 
more or less competitive and the resultant legislatures 
became more than rubber-stamp institutions. Gorbachev 
was still the strong man, though getting increasingly 
weaker by the day as Boris Yeltsin increased his power 
base in Russia; the population acquiesced in, without 
being enthusiastic about, Gorbachev's rule; the media 
and society, though strikingly freer, were still dominated 
by the Party and state; repression had become decidedly 
selective; and the army and KGB still played a large 
role in the ruling elites. With the Soviet economy and 
Communist ideology in shambles, it would be hard 
to speak of anything resembling a state alliance with 
dominant market forces or of an overarching ideology of 
statism or hyper-nationalism.
This imperfect form of authoritarianism lasted in 
Russia for about two to three years, until the failed coup
17. See Jerzy Mackow, Totalitarismus und danach (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 2005).
18. Janos Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of 
Communism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp.
360-378.
19. See Karl Deutsch, “Cracks in the Monolith: Possibilities and 
Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian Systems,” in Harry Eckstein 
and David E. Apter, eds., Comparative Politics: A Reader (New York: 
Free Press, 1963), pp. 497-508.
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attempt of August 19-21, 1991 and Yeltsin's subsequent 
accession to power, when Russia's political system 
began moving more decisively toward democracy. The 
system built by Yeltsin was deeply flawed—the bombing 
of the Duma in late 1993 was anything but democratic 
and the manipulation of the presidential elections of 
1996 was scandalous—but it was democratic. Russia 
did have multiple parties, genuine elections, and an 
autonomous parliament. Its leader was the president, and 
not some charismatic man on horseback. The dominant 
ideology rested on notions of popular sovereignty, and 
not on statism or hyper-nationalism. The economy was 
becoming increasingly market-oriented and state control 
was weakening, not increasing. Popular support was 
at best lukewarm; pro-regime mass movements were 
absent; representatives of the military and secret police— 
the notorious siloviki—were only just beginning to seep 
into the ruling structures; the media and society were 
more or less free; and repression was minimal. Crime, 
corruption, and violence from below were rampant, but 
those were not features of the system per se. Yeltsin's 
system also had elements of authoritarianism, and it was 
characterized by an extensive blurring of lines of authority 
between and among ministries and regions, thereby 
creating the impression, if not reality, of chaos. But, in 
the final analysis, Yeltsin's Russia was not quite hybrid— 
if by that is meant a system that is equally democratic and 
equally authoritarian—but rather imperfectly democratic, 
that is, a democracy with substantial elements of 
authoritarianism.20
As soon as Putin became president in 2000, a move 
away from Yeltsin-style democracy quickly became 
evident. In Lilia Shevtsova's words, “In 2000-2001 
the new Russian leader practically began refashioning 
the Yeltsin regime by taking apart its most important 
building blocks. Instead of the Yeltsin principle of 
mutual connivance, shadowy checks and balances, 
tolerance for opposition, and the maintenance of power 
by redistributing and decentralizing it and provoking 
constant revolutionary shocks, Putin turned to the 
principle of subordination, hierarchical submission, 
quelling opposition, control over alternative ways of 
thinking of the elite, and centralization of the federation. 
In essence, Putin began to build a ‘conveyer belt' political 
regime.”21
Eight years later, Russia had moved decisively
20. There is another reason, at least in retrospect, to consider Yeltsin's 
Russia more democratic than authoritarian. If Yeltsin's Russia is the 
former, then Putin's changes represent systemic discontinuity; if 
Yeltsin's Russia is the latter, then Putin's changes represent systemic 
continuity.
21. Lilia Shevtsova, “Political Leadership in Russia's Transformation,” 
in Alexander J. Motyl, Blair A. Ruble, and Lilia Shevtsova, eds.,
Russia's Engagement with the West (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005),
p. 100.
away from any reputable definition of democracy 
(“managed” or “sovereign” democracy obviously does 
not count) and toward what I term fascism. By late 2008, 
democratic institutions were at best moribund, having 
been transformed into pliant tools of the Kremlin; the 
party of power, United Russia, dominated the political 
scene, even if its members were rarely fanatics of the kind 
often encountered in fascist movements; civil society 
and the press were severely circumscribed; the siloviki 
dominated all ruling elites and suffused them with their 
antidemocratic ethos; the state promoted capitalism 
while making sure to command its strategic heights by 
means of controlling key industries, especially in energy, 
defense, mining, and manufacturing; the Russian state 
was unabashedly glorified to the point of representing a 
genuine fetish; despite the election of Dmitri Medvedev 
as president in the spring of 2008, Prime Minister Putin 
remained the undisputed “national leader,” and his 
image exuded vigor, youth, and manliness22; a variety of 
rabidly pro-Putin youth groups—with Nashi as the most 
celebrated example—acted as the vanguard of the leader; 
the population overwhelmingly supported Putin, and 
had done so since he assumed the presidency; a growing 
mistrust of both internal and external foreigners and a 
corresponding glorification of Russia's past (including 
its criminal Stalinist period) and present were the official 
worldview.
Is Putin's Russia Fascist?
Of all these factors, the defining characteristics of 
fascism—the non-democratic and non-socialist nature 
of Russia's political system, the hyper-nationalist, statist 
ideology, the hyper-masculine cult of the supreme leader, 
and the enthusiastically supportive population—are 
central to our enquiry. I consider these briefly in turn.
• Non-democratic and non-socialist political system:
Elections to the Duma and presidency are generally 
regarded as unfair and unfree—even though almost 
everyone agrees that Putin and his allies would 
win even if elections were fair and free. (This 
seeming paradox is resolved easily enough when 
one remembers that Putin and his comrades are 
not democrats and have no need of democracy.) 
By the same token, the Duma has been effectively 
transformed into a rubber-stamp parliament, partly 
as a result of changes to its structure and procedures 
and mostly as a result of the dominance within it, and 
the larger political system, of the pro-presidential
22. For an analysis of Putin's relationship with Medvedev, see Amy 
Knight, “The Truth about Putin and Medvedev,” New York Review of
Books, May 15, 2008, pp. 11-14.
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party of power, United Russia. To be sure, United 
Russia does not resemble twentieth-century fascist 
movements striving for power. The former is a 
loose agglomeration of mostly opportunists who 
boarded a regime-sponsored political band wagon; 
the latter were, like the Bolsheviks, cadre parties of 
true believers. A more apposite comparison would 
be with the Nazis or Fascists in power, by which 
time their ranks had been swelled by hangers-on and 
careerists and both had become popular container 
parties that only slightly resembled the militant 
movements from which they had sprung. At the 
same time, United Russia clearly does not—or does 
not yet—dominate all of Russia's political, social, 
economic, and cultural institutions and, in that sense, 
falls far short of the reality in Hitler's Germany or 
Mussolini's Italy. The claim that post-Soviet Russia 
is non-socialist requires, I trust, no elaboration.
• Stctism and hyper-nationalism: Although Russia 
lacks a coherent ideology of the sort encountered 
in the Soviet Union, fascist Italy, or Nazi 
Germany, the prevailing ideological currents, or 
discourse, clearly promote and glorify both the 
Russian state and the Russian people. The concept 
of “sovereign democracy”, for instance, is about 
a strong Russian state, and not about democracy. 
Especially emblematic of this discourse is 
Putin's 2007 “Speech at the Reception on the 
Occasion of National Unity Day”, in which he 
emphasized the indivisible relationship between 
national unity, national greatness, and state 
strength.23 Unlike Mussolini and Hitler, whose 
style was histrionic and whose language was 
often bombastic, Putin usually comes across as 
cool and collected. Notwithstanding the style,
23. “On this very day a long time ago, in 1612, at the foot of the 
Kremlin's walls we celebrated more than simply a victory over foreign 
invaders. Thanks to the unity displayed by the multinational people of 
Russia we managed to end the many years of troubles and internal 
strife. It was the way Russian society rallied together and the 
responsibility it took for the country's destiny that allowed us to 
defend our independence and renew Russian statehood. We created the 
conditions to construct and establish an enormous great power, 
stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean. Without a doubt, 
authentic patriotic actions by Russian citizens have constituted the 
might and power of our people over many centuries. They have 
promoted unfailing spiritual values that are transferred to generation
from generation.... Modern Russia is strong not only because of its
new economic successes or its growing influence in international
affairs. Russia was and remains powerful thanks to national unity and, 
of course, thanks to the tremendous intellectual and creative potential 
of our people, talented, qualified people who sincerely desire to act for 
the benefit of their nation. This is the best bridge to the successful 
future of Russia, to reviving and strengthening our country's historic 
role.” <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/11/04/0924_ 
type127286_150361.shtml>.
Putin's message of state greatness differs little 
from that of other fascist leaders. Russia's official 
ideology of nationalism, meanwhile, does fall 
short of the style and substance of Mussolini's or 
Hitler's extreme claims. Accordingly, Russians 
are great, as are their past and present and 
future, but—aside from official toleration and 
encouragement of Russian superciliousness 
toward other non-Russians—that greatness does 
not yet entail racism and overt ethnocentrism.24 
On the other hand, Russia's unofficial discourse 
of nationalism has witnessed the mainstreaming 
of such ultranationalists and fascists as Aleksandr 
Dugin, Aleksandr Prokhanov, Dmitri Rogozin, 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov.25 It is surely indicative of both great- 
power and ultra-nationalist rhetoric that Putin 
on March 8, 2008 called Medvedev a “Russian 
nationalist”—in the presence of, of all people, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Even though 
Putin insisted that he meant that “in the good 
sense of the word,” he could not have not known 
that his use of the term was a slap in the face of 
German discursive sensibilities.26
• Hyper-masculine cult of supreme leader: Like 
Mussolini, Putin favors stylish black clothing 
that connotes toughness and seriousness.27 Like 
Mussolini, Putin likes being photographed in 
the presence of weapons and other instruments 
of war. And like Mussolini, Putin likes to show 
off his presumed physical prowess. The specially 
released late-2007 pre-electoral video showing 
Putin in a variety of manly poses—on horseback, 
with automatic rifles, wading through a river— 
and usually bare-chested deserves particular 
attention and arguably represents a watershed 
in Putin's self-representation.28 Not only is the 
video extraordinary in its blatant depiction of
24. Note Schopflin's comment: “The rise of a fairly unpleasant brand 
of chauvinist nationalism in Russia has two consequences. It makes all 
things non-Russian inherently suspect and makes the criteria of 
Russian-ness—language, race, a very particular version of history, 
Orthodoxy and territorial ambition—the sole way of interpreting the 
world.” George Schopflin, “Russia's reinvented empire,” March 5, 
2007, <www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_govern- 
ment/russia_empire_4589.jsp>. See also Elfie Siegl, “Von Stalins Sieg 
zum Sieg Putins. Der Kreml und sein Geschichtsbild,” Russlandanaly- 
sen, November 9, 2007, nr. 148, pp. 2-4.
25. Charles Clover, “Invasion's Ideologues,” Financial Times, 
September 9, 2008, p. 9.
26. “Otvety na voprosy zhurnalistov po okonchanii peregovorov s 
Federal'nym kantslerom Germanii Angeloi Merkel',” March 8, 2008, 
<president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/03/161952.shtml>.
27. See Catharine Nepomnyashchy, “Man in Black: Putin and the 
Power of the Image,” Unpublished paper.
28. This video may be viewed on www.russia.ru/putin/.
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Putin as the quintessence of virility and a man's 
man, but it is quite open in targeting the youngish 
female voter to whom, apparently, Putin's 
“political technologists” believed such gendered 
representations of masculinity would necessarily 
appeal.29
• Widespread popular support: Like Mussolini and 
Hitler, Putin enjoys enormous popular appeal.30 
Despite the many ups and downs of his years in office, 
Russians have consistently supported him to the tune 
of 70-plus percent. Like Hitler and Mussolini, Putin 
has restored law, order, and stability—or at least the 
semblance thereof.31 Far more important, Putin has 
also restored Russians' pride in themselves, their 
present, and their past—in part by rehabilitating 
Stalin—and given Russians hope in their future. 
And like Hitler and Mussolini, Putin claims to be 
fulfilling nothing more than the people's mandate.32
29Note in this light Mussolini's claim, “Fascism desires an active man, 
one engaged in activity with all his energies: it desires a man virilely 
conscious of the difficulties that exist in action and ready to face 
them.” Adrian Lyttleton, ed., Italian Fascisms: From Pareto to Gentile 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 40.
30. One Russian historian who compared Putin with Hitler in a 
December 2007 article entitled “Putin—Our Good Hitler” became the 
object of official investigation. See <http://www.kommersant.ru/ 
region/perm/page.htm?year=2008&issue=27&id=247780&secti
on=7272>.
31. See David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and 
Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1980).
32. Consider the following exchange, from Putin's December 12, 2007 
interview with Time magazine:
QUESTION: You have spoken very confidently about Russia's role in 
international affairs. People say that it was harder to carry out this poli­
cy at the start of your presidency, but now that you have become a very 
strong president, I want to ask you: when did you become a national 
leader? What determines this position? When were you able to say to 
yourself, “Yes, now I have become a true leader”?
VLADIMIR PUTIN: First of all, this is something I never thought 
about, just as I never thought that I would one day be President. And 
now, to be honest, I try not to think about it because I think that when 
people start to think they are somehow exceptional, some kind of 
exceptional leader, they start to lose touch with reality.
I never called myself a national leader. It is others who have called me 
this. I did not think up this term and have never sought it. When I 
became President the country found itself unwillingly plunged into the 
chaos of civil war in the Caucasus and faced enormous economic 
difficulties, the collapse of the social sphere and a huge number of 
people living below the poverty line.
I can say to you with all certainty that I did not just take this job, step 
into this office, as it were, but I decided for myself that I was ready to 
do everything I could, to make any sacrifice, in order to restore the 
country. I made this the main purpose of my life and I decided that my 
own life in the broad sense, my personal life and interests, therefore 
ended.
Destiny has given me the chance to play a positive role in the history 
of my people, and I see myself as a part of this people and feel very 
strongly my connection to them. I have always felt this and I feel it 
now, and from the moment I made my decision I have subjugated my 
entire life to this goal.
I think that these goals have been reached to a large extent. We now
The following quotation, from Putin's last press 
conference as president in February 2008, is an excellent 
example of his discourse of statism, hyper-nationalism, 
cult of personality, and popular support and needs 
no commentary. According to the Financial Times 
correspondent, Putin “poured scorn on speculation in the 
western press that he had built up an enormous personal 
fortune while in power, saying the reports had been 
‘picked out of their noses and then smeared all over the 
papers.' He said: ‘I am the richest person not only in 
Europe but also in the world. I collect emotions. And I 
am rich because the Russian people twice entrusted me 
with the leadership of such a great country as Russia. I 
think this is my greatest fortune.'”33
Is, then, Putin's Russia fascist? As this checklist 
suggests, Russia is rather more than a simple authoritarian 
state. Some scholars have tried to capture this difference 
by employing such terms as patrimonial or tsarist. Anne 
Applebaum speaks of “Putinism.”34 Although these terms 
are fine as descriptive designations, they fail to locate 
today's Russia on a spectrum of political systems and, 
thus, to convey the magnitude of the changes wrought by 
Putin. I suggest that the term fascism can therefore tell us 
just how much, as well as the direction in which, Russia 
has changed.
To be sure, although Putin's Russia possesses many 
of the defining characteristics of fascism, it does so only 
to a greater or lesser extent. Having emerged haphazardly 
only in the last few years, these characteristics have 
not yet assumed the form of a consolidated political 
system; nor is it clear that they are here to stay. In that 
sense, Russia today resembles Germany in 1933 or 
Italy in the early-to-mid-1920s. Russia could follow in 
their footsteps, or it could falter and find its way back 
to some form of democracy or authoritarianism. Located 
somewhere between authoritarianism and fascism, 
today's Russia may therefore be termed fascistoid. If the 
system remains as is, or even hardens during Medvedev's 
presidency, then one will be able to say that Russia has 
moved even further toward a full-fledged fascism. If the 
system breaks down, or undergoes significant change in 
the direction of democracy or authoritarianism, then the
have other problems, just as big, that we must address, but these are 
already problems of a different kind, and we have every opportunity 
for making progress.
So when you ask me when I first had this feeling of being a leader, I 
can say that I haven't had this feeling and I don't have it now. I feel 
like a work horse that is hauling along a cart filled with a heavy load, 
and I can tell you that the satisfaction I feel from my work depends on 
how rapidly and effectively I manage to make progress along this road. 
< http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/12/19/1618_
type82916_154779.shtml>.
33. Catherine Belton, “Putin maps out strategy to retain powerful 
role,” Financial Times, February 14, 2008, p. 4.
34. Anne Applebaum, “Putinism: Democracy, the Russian Way,” The 
Berlin Journal, spring 2008, no. 16, pp. 43-47.
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transition toward fascism will have proven unsuccessful. 
For the first few months of Medvedev's tenure, the 
verdict seemed unclear, as both he and Prime Minister 
Putin appeared to be jockeying for power. The August 
war against Georgia saw Putin return to prominence—in 
exactly the kind of hyper-masculine role he had crafted 
as president—and suggested that Russia was moving 
toward fascism.35 Medvedev's “Go, Russia!” article of 
September 2009, on the other hand, seemed to suggest 
that he was pushing back and that a return toward simple 
authoritarianism might still be possible.36 In sum, Russia 
remains mired in the fascistoid no-man's land between 
authoritarianism and fascism. And it may stay there until 
the next presidential elections. If, at that point, Putin runs 
and wins, the verdict should be clearer.
Theoretical Approaches to Systemic 
Change
One may explain Russia's, or any country's, 
systemic transformations as the product of 1) political 
culture, 2) structural or institutional forces, or 3) elite 
decisions—with the first two approaches reflecting 
“structure” and the third reflecting “agency” in the 
structure vs. agency debate. Cultural explanations that 
assume the persistence of cultural norms, attitudes, or 
discourses are best at explaining systemic continuities or 
reversions to past forms; they are generally weak when 
it comes to explaining breaks with the past. Structural 
and institutional explanations can explain persistence 
and change, but they cannot account for timing. Elite 
explanations can explain persistence, change, and timing, 
but in being able to account for everything, they easily 
run the risk of being trivially true.
In explaining the shift from totalitarianism to 
authoritarianism, a cultural explanation would focus on 
the growing gap that developed in the last two decades of 
Leonid Brezhnev's rule between official Soviet ideology, 
discourse, and norms on the one hand and popular 
ideology, discourse, and norms on the other. Such an 
explanation would then emphasize how the notion of 
systemic failure was “constructed” by opposition elites— 
in particular the non-Russian popular fronts that emerged 
during perestroika37—who managed to delegitimize the
35. See Stephen Blank, “Russia's War on Georgia: The Domestic 
Conflict,” Perspective, October 2008, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 1-5.
According to Blank, “Apart from the enshrinement of a condition of 
permanent threat and the predisposition to adventurism, the other 
domestic context of this invasion is the extension of Putin's primacy. 
Even if we concede that the war's motives and origins lie largely in the 
realm of geopolitical considerations, it is clear that it has served to 
extend Putin's leadership.”
36. Dmitrii Medvedev, “Rossiya, vpered!” September 10, 2009. 
<http://news.kremlin.ru/news/5413>
37. See Thomas Sherlock, Historical Narratives in the Soviet Union
and Post-Soviet Russia (New York: Palgrave, 2007). .
authorities, mobilize their own discursive constituencies, 
and create systemic collapse. A cultural explanation 
would then emphasize the emergence of a democratic 
discourse of popular sovereignty in the late-perestroika 
years, Yeltsin's appropriation of democratic rhetoric in 
the aftermath of the failed August 1991 coup, and the 
resultant discursive momentum toward a democratic 
form of government. Seen in this light, democracy 
could never really have taken hold because, despite the 
temporary emergence of a democratic discourse, Russian 
political culture, as it developed in the course of hundreds 
of years, is non-democratic and imperial and Russians 
like strong rule by strong men—a point the Marquis de 
Custine would probably have endorsed.38 The drift away 
from democracy was therefore inevitable. Russians 
were therefore grateful to Putin for having restored both 
stability, which they supposedly value above all else, and 
their sense of pride, in themselves and in their formerly 
humiliated country, great Mother Russia.
In explaining the shift from totalitarianism to 
authoritarianism, a structural/institutional explanation 
would focus on the internal systemic contradictions 
and inefficiencies of totalitarianism and argue that 
totalitarianism was fated, as in Karl Marx's understanding 
of capitalism, to collapse.39 That it collapsed at the time 
it did was due to Gorbachev's institutionally induced 
inability to appreciate—indeed, to see—the importance 
to the USSR's stability of the nationality factor and 
unwillingness to stop perestroika from eviscerating the 
Soviet body politic. A structural/institutional explanation 
would then highlight the collapse of the Communist Party, 
as an all-embracing institution that defined the nature of 
the political system, and its replacement by a plethora of 
parties, movements, and groupings that began competing 
for power in a manner that approximated competition 
and democracy. Finally, democracy had to fail from this 
perspective because the construction of stable democratic 
institutions was incompatible with Russia's inheritance 
of the institutional legacies of totalitarian and imperial 
collapse.
An elite explanation of the shift from totalitarianism to 
authoritarianism would focus on Gorbachev's decisions, 
first, to implement glasnost and perestroika and, second, 
not to rein them in once disintegrative processes had been 
unleashed. The rise of Yeltsin as president of Russia and 
the emergence with him of a counterforce to Gorbachev, 
the gradual transformation of the Communist bosses of 
the non-Russian republics into national Communists 
supporting sovereignty and then independence, and the
38. See also Edward Keenan, “Muscovite Political Folkways,” Russian
Review, vol. 45, 1986, pp. 158-181.
39. For a structural argument along these lines, see Alexander J. Motyl,
Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
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inability of Gorbachev to meet the challenge they posed 
to him and his authority would round out the picture 
through 1991. Yeltsin's ability to outflank his opponents 
by employing force against the recalcitrant parliament in 
late 1993, his decision to hold more or less fair and free 
presidential elections in 1996, tolerate party competition, 
and refrain from pursuing unlimited presidential power 
would be the key factors behind the emergence in the 
1990s of a weak form of democracy. Finally, an elite 
explanation would focus on Putin the ex-KGB officer 
who packed the ruling elites with his allies from among 
the siloviki, emasculated the regions, and progressively 
dismantled the country's democratic structures and 
replaced them with fascist-like ones.40
Although these approaches are different, the fact 
that they all do an adequate job of explaining Russia's 
systemic transformations suggests, first, that Russia's 
move toward fascism may have been over-determined 
and, second, that we may therefore employ all three in 
explaining Russia's fall from totalitarianism and drift 
through authoritarianism and democracy toward fascism. 
The next section will attempt to craft a coherent account 
of Russia's systemic transformations that draws on all 
three approaches within a framework that employs two 
key concepts—totalitarianism and empire.
Explaining Russian Exceptionalism
Russia's exceptional trajectory—from totalitarianism 
to authoritarianism to democracy to fascism—is the 
result of its exceptional status within the Soviet system 
of rule. In contrast to all the other post-Communist states, 
Russia was the core of both the totalitarian system and the 
Soviet empire. That is, although the Russian population 
suffered enormously from the misrule of the Communist 
Party, the Soviet secret police, and their leaders, the 
institutions that ran the totalitarian and imperial systems 
were lodged in Russia, were run by Russian cadres, and 
employed Russian language and culture as instruments 
of rule. Russians also viewed these institutions and the 
Soviet state and empire as fundamentally theirs.
The collapse of totalitarianism and empire thus had 
different implications for non-Russians and Russians. 
First, collapse meant expanded freedom for all the 
peoples of the former Soviet empire, but for Russians it 
also, if not primarily, meant strategic defeat and intense 
national humiliation.41 *Second, while collapse forced non- 
Russians to embark on ideologically legitimated positive 
projects of nation- and state-building, it forced Russians
40. See Andrew Jack, Inside Putin's Russia (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).
41. See Alexander J. Motyl, “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial
Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective,” 
Comparative Politics, vol. 31, no. 2, January 1999, pp. 127-145.
to salvage what remained of a superpower and great state. 
Third, collapse bequeathed weak and underdeveloped 
institutions and armies to the formerly Soviet non-Russian 
states in the “near abroad,” and relatively coherent, 
experienced, and well-staffed governing institutions, a 
secret police, and a powerful army to the Russians.
In other words, collapse stacked the cards against 
democracy in Russia. The population, whose political 
culture was anti-democratic to start with, viewed nation­
building as being primarily about reestablishing its lost 
position of glory as a “great people” and state-building as 
being primarily about reestablishing the “great Russian 
state.” No other population in the former Soviet space was 
encumbered with such a mind-set. Worse, the Russian 
Federation inherited the very institutions—still powerful 
central ministries and a strong and powerful secret police 
and army—that were least inclined to support democratic 
projects. Further complicating things was the economic 
collapse and breakdown in law and order that afflicted 
Russia and every other post-Communist state in the 
1990s. All elites and populations in all the states had to 
cope with the resulting disorder and many were tempted 
to adopt or prolong authoritarian solutions, but only in 
Russia did this time of troubles become transformed into 
a discursive mantra that blamed democracy for all of 
Russia's ills and seemed to justify a widespread systemic 
transformation toward dictatorial rule.
Putin's ability to assume power in 1999-2000, to 
consolidate his rule quickly, and to attain the status of 
a popular “national leader” therefore had as much to 
do with the condition of post-Soviet Russia as with any 
personal talents he may have possessed. Putin the career 
KGB officer represented the ideal “man on horseback” 
who would end the besporyadok and khaos (disorder 
and chaos) that was created by the collapse of empire 
and totalitarianism and that was so repugnant to an 
authoritarian political culture. That same background also 
provided him with invaluable contacts with the already 
large percentage of siloviki who had managed to infiltrate 
the establishment in the 1990s. Unlike Mussolini and 
Hitler, Putin was an insider who neither had to march 
on the capital nor wage street battles and sit in jail. And 
because Putin emerged from within the system, he did not 
need—or have—a full-fledged ideological program for 
storming the citadels of power. Instead, he could proceed 
to construct a fascistoid state without declaring that he 
would do so—and, perhaps, without even knowing that 
he would do so.
Unsurprisingly, post-Soviet Russia's developmental 
path resembles that of post-World War I Germany. 
Both countries lost empires and experienced profound 
humiliation. Both countries then experienced extreme 
economic hardship under the stewardship of weak and 
corrupt democratic regimes. Both countries blamed
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democracy and its internal and external supporters for 
their ills. Both countries turned to hyper-nationalism, 
state fetishization, and strong-man rule. In both countries 
strong men seized power—by legitimate means, by the 
way—and exploited popular willingness to submit to 
domination to establish their dictatorial rule. Seen in 
this light, fascism, pace Marxist theories thereof, is not 
so much the product of the “crisis of capitalism,” as of 
the “crisis of democracy” in weakened and humiliated 
states with nondemocratic political cultures. Linz's 
explanation of inter-war fascism is strikingly relevant 
to post-Soviet Russia: “Fascism was the novel response 
to the crisis—profound or temporary—of the pre-war 
social structure and party system and to the emergence 
of new institutional arrangements as a result of war and 
post-war dislocations. It would be particularly acute in 
defeated nations, in those which were divided about entry 
into the war and disappointed with the fruits of victory, 
such as Italy, and those countries where the crisis led to 
unsuccessful revolutionary attempts. Fascism would be 
a counter-revolutionary response led by a revolutionary 
elite.”42
Challenges for Fascistoid Russia
Although totalitarianism decays in the long run, 
it tends to be stable in the short to medium term, as all 
its components reinforce total control—until they do 
not, at which point the slide toward breakdown may be 
inevitable. Authoritarian systems are stable as long as they 
can repress populations—which becomes increasingly 
hard to do over time, as the costs of repression mount and 
revenues usually decline. Democracies may be the most 
stable, especially in the long term, as they are generally 
able to enjoy some degree of popular support, minimize 
the costs of compliance, and promote economic growth. 
Fascism may be least stable in the short, medium, and long 
terms, generating three contradictions, or weaknesses, 
relating to the supreme leader, the willingness of the 
population to obey, and the effect of fascist rhetoric and 
behavior on neighboring states.
(1) Cults of vigorous leaders cannot be sustained 
as leaders inevitably grow old or decrepit. A continual 
rejuvenation of the supreme leader might solve the 
problem were it not for the fact that fascist leaders do 
not want to give up power. Sooner or later, fascist leaders 
lose their core legitimacy, and when they do, both their 
followers and the submissive population begin to look 
for alternative idols. Putin, although young and vigorous 
today, will not remain young forever. And an old and 
decrepit Russian leader will not be able to make the case 
for youth, vigor, and manliness in typical fascist style.
42. Linz, p. 7.
Moreover, fascist regimes are invariably fragmented. 
Extreme centralization of power in a supreme leader is 
supposed to ensure elite coordination and submission; 
instead, it inclines elites to compete for the leader's favor, 
to amass resources and build regional or bureaucratic 
empires, and not to cooperate with their colleagues- 
turned-competitors. Fascist regimes are thus brittle, and 
when supreme leaders falter—as they inevitably do, 
especially during times of crisis—or leave the scene, 
successor elites engage in cutthroat competition to 
assume the mantle of authority. In so doing, however, 
they not only weaken the regime, but they also expose 
the system as less than the imposing monolith projected 
to the submissive population.
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and its impact 
on Russia's banks, oligarchs, stock market, energy, and 
growth prospects are likely to intensify elite infighting and 
erode Putin's aura of omnipotence, especially if popular 
living standards begin to decline. The next few years will 
be particularly difficult for Russia, as Putin tries to remain 
in control of a political system formally led by Medvedev 
without becoming the target of popular opprobrium and 
elite opposition. Chances are that Putin will attempt 
to shift the blame onto Medvedev, present himself as 
Russia's only hope, and manipulate elites and publics to 
force Medvedev to resign—just as the economy is about 
to improve. Of course, Putin could fail. The siloviki and 
other elites may turn against him and the public may 
tire of his play-acting—especially if the economic crisis 
proves deeper and longer-lasting. Whatever the outcome, 
Russian politics will be exceedingly unsettled. And 
regardless of who leads the government, these tensions 
and uncertainties will undermine the effectiveness of the 
system and its capacity to retain popular support.43
(2) Popular humiliation and the willingness to 
submit to unconditional authority are weak foundations 
on which to build states. Sooner or later, Russians will 
not feel humiliated and, when that happens—as it surely 
will, once their prosperity and exposure to the world and 
its blandishment increases—they will be less inclined 
to accept leader cults and authoritarian rule by shadowy 
siloviki. To be sure, Russian political culture may be 
authoritarian, and, as such, it will sustain fascism. But 
strategic sectors of Russia society—the middle class and 
students—will increasingly reject that culture and prove 
to be a source of new thinking about Russia's politics.
The rise of a middle class committed to private 
property, rule of law, and greater involvement in the 
political process is an obvious challenge to the longer- 
term stability of a fascist state. Even if official elites
43. See James Sherr, “Russia and the West: A Reassessment,” Defence 
Academy of the United Kingdom, The Shrivenham Papers, no. 6, 
January 2008, p. 19.
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succeed in converting affluent and educated Russians to 
hyper-nationalism and neo-imperialism—as many elites 
have done in the past—a middle class could force the 
state to make concessions to its preferences and, over 
time, evolve into a milder form of authoritarian rule. 
The middle class could come to play a more directly 
destabilizing rule in times of political or economic crisis, 
especially during periods of intense elite infighting. 
Ukraine's more affluent citizens threw in their lot with 
the Orange revolutionaries in late 2004 and, by providing 
them with material support, were able to ensure their 
victory. Russia's affluent citizens could just as easily 
follow in the Ukrainians' footsteps, if conditions appear 
to favor their interests—as they just might if the financial 
collapse of 2008 has severe repercussions and the elites 
appear incapable of finding quick and painless solutions.
Students are the traditional bearers of revolution in 
almost all societies, and it is at first glance remarkable 
that Russia's many students have thus far been quiet. 
Like Americans and Europeans in the 1950s, they may 
be responding to past economic insecurity and current 
economic prospects by focusing on their educations 
and careers. But, like their American and European 
counterparts in the 1960s, they may, once a certain degree 
of prosperity can be taken for granted while politics 
remains nondemocratic, have the self-assurance to 
translate their critical thinking and youthful enthusiasm 
into protest. On their own, students in developed societies 
are rarely able to do more than cause trouble. If their 
rebellions coincide with or feed off larger social unrest, 
economic crisis, and political infighting, however, the 
potential for instability can grow correspondingly.
(3) All fascist states scare their neighbors and 
provoke them to defend themselves against perceived 
threats emanating from the behavior and bluster of fascist 
leaders. In that sense, fascist hyper-nationalism becomes 
a self-ful fi lling prophecy—effectively creating the very 
enemies it invokes as the reasons for its justification. 
The soldiers and policemen who run fascist states have a 
natural proclivity to toughness and weaponry. The hyper­
nationalism, state fetishes, and cult of hyper-masculinity 
incline fascist states to see enemies everywhere. The 
cult-like status of leaders encourages them to pound their 
chests with abandon. And the population's implication in 
its own repression leads it to balance its self-humiliation 
with attempts to humiliate others. Unsurprisingly, Russia 
has taken to asserting its “rightful” place in the sun by
engaging in energy blackmail vis-a-vis Ukraine, Belarus,
and the Baltic states, cyber-wars against Estonia, a war
against Georgia, Polar land grabs, saber-rattling in the 
Crimea, and other forms of aggressive behavior.
Russia will create ever more suspicious and 
terrified neighbors the longer it remains fascistoid.
Those neighbors—in particular Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan—will 
not just roll over and accept a fait accompli crafted in 
Moscow. Instead, they will seek existential solutions to 
existential threats. At a minimum, this means beefing up 
substantially their defense expenditures, crafting anti­
Russian alliances, subordinating economic reform to the 
exigencies of security, and viewing their own Russian­
speaking populations as potential fifth columns. More 
likely than not, the non-Russian states that feel most 
threatened by Russia will follow in Israel's footsteps 
and seek security guarantees from the United States 
and shelter under the American nuclear umbrella. At a 
maximum, this means doing exactly what the Israelis 
have done: secretly acquiring nuclear weapons. All the 
ex-Soviet states have the know-how to build nuclear 
reactors and weapons; Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan 
even inherited hundreds of warheads after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. And some of their leaders have openly 
expressed regret at having transferred them to Russia in 
the early 1990s.
Naturally, these defensive reactions will only succeed 
in persuading Russia's ruling elites that continued power 
enhancement is imperative, both in defense of the 
fatherland and in defense of their “abandoned brethren” 
in the non-Russian states. A “quick, little war” might then 
become tempting, as a means of rallying the population 
around the flag, of distracting attention from economic 
woes, and of teaching the non-Russians a lesson. Crisis 
and overreach will then become likely—especially as 
Russia is far weaker than its elites believe44—and the 
resulting foreign-policy disasters will serve to expose 
the regime and leader as less than all-knowing and all­
competent and thereby accelerate elite fragmentation and 
popular dissatisfaction.45
The End of Fascistoid Russia
Russia faces an additional problem—one peculiar 
to its economy. Because energy resources have fueled 
Russia's economic development, the centrality of 
energy and, thus, of easy money will transform, and 
perhaps already has transformed, Russia into a “petro­
state” that already serves as an impediment to further 
economic development and political stability. Energy­
generated easy money encourages state elites to engage 
in corruption and outright theft and to use the state as a 
source of patronage. Easy money therefore promotes a
44. See Allen C. Lynch, How Russia Is Not Ruled (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Rajan Menon and Alexander J. 
Motyl, “The Myth of Russian Resurgence,” The American Interest, 
vol. 2, no. 4, March/April 2007, pp. 96-101
45. On overreach, see Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of 
Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Jack Snyder, 
Myths of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).
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bloated and parasitic state apparatus whose efficiency and 
effectiveness decline as lines of command become blurred, 
elites engage in localized empire building, resources are 
diverted from their intended uses, and corruption gets 
out of control. Elite fragmentation weakens the supreme 
leader, while untrammeled rent-seeking both undercuts 
the persuasiveness of statist ideology and impedes 
the development of the middle class. Easy money also 
encourages elites to engage in saber-rattling vis-a-vis 
their neighbors.
The 2008-2009 economic crisis will both enhance 
these tendencies and create debilitating contradictions. 
On the one hand, capital flight, declining foreign direct 
investment, and the drop in energy prices will reduce the 
ability of the petro-state to generate easy money. On the 
other hand, growing state intervention in a crisis-ridden 
economy will inevitably increase corruption and promote 
further elite infighting, both over policy and over the 
shrinking pie. In sum, a fascistoid Russia faces the risk of 
decay, and perhaps even breakdown, in the not too distant 
future.
Which way will a destabilized Russia go— 
toward democracy or toward authoritarianism? A 
cultural approach to systemic change would suggest 
that authoritarianism, as being more in sync with an
authoritarian political culture, is more likely. A structural/ 
institutional approach would probably come down on 
the side of some messy form of democracy as the most 
likely aftermath of the supreme leader's fall from power 
and the concomitant elite infighting. An elite approach 
could go either way, especially as Putin's opponents can 
be found among both the democratic opposition and the 
hard-line siloviki. If these calculations are correct, then 
the most one can say with any degree of confidence is 
that a post-fascist Russia will probably enter an extended 
time of troubles characterized by different forces pulling 
it in different directions—both toward and away from 
democracy. The only thing that seems certain is that, 
as besporyadok and khaos increase, Russians will curse 
Putin for their misfortunes.
Alexander J. Motyl is Professor of Political Science at 
Rutgers University-Newark.
A shortened version of this article originally appeared 
as “Russland: Volk, Staat und Fuhrer: Elemente eines 
faschistischen Systems,” Osteuropa, January 2009. It is 
printed here with the permission of Osteuropa.
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Three Perspectives on Ethnography from Ukraine: 
The Mysterious Tale of a Lost Hutsul Manuscript, 
Its Recovery, and the Dialogues that Ensued
Maria Sonevytsky
A
t the historic meeting of folklorists, ethnographers 
and ethnomusicologists on the 70th anniversary 
of the founding of the Department of Ukrainian 
Folklore at Ivan Franko University in L'viv, Ukraine, old 
and new models of scholarship clashed, in ways both 
subtle and fierce. Generations of Ukrainian scholars, in 
addition to three representatives from the U.S. (myself 
included) took part in the meeting.1 Papers ranged from 
analyses in the Soviet formalist folklore style—now 
reinvented as the nationalist Ukrainian style—to papers 
exploring the archives and biographies of founders of 
the discipline in Ukraine (including Filaret Kolessa, 
after whom the department is named). Topics discussed 
also revealed generational rifts in what constituted valid 
terrain for folklore studies: when some young scholars 
tackled subjects such as how mass e-mail love notes can 
be considered modern folklore, or explored the humorous 
texts of Ukrainian-Canadian kolomyjky (rural Western 
Ukrainian dance songs) that have a vibrant second life 
in the diaspora, their papers would often be met with 
pointed questions about intellectual worth from the elders 
of the field, accusations of irreverence or irrelevance 
coquettishly or ironically rebutted by younger presenters.
Observing this dynamic, along with the nationalist 
zeal expressed by a sizable number of career folklorists, 
I noted the difference from the much more neutral tone 
of conferences in the United States, where intellectual 
dialogue very rarely seems to escalate to the sputtering pitch 
that characterized much of the L'vivan conference. The 
impassioned attitudes towards the vitality of the discipline 
and its meaning for Ukraine as a viable country called to 
mind Mark von Hagen's analysis of the state of Ukrainian 
historiography and the re-emergence of Ukrainian history 
as an academic discipline when he asked “Does Ukraine 
Have a History?” Von Hagen argued that Ukraine will 
“need a civic, patriotic history of its nation-state,” but that 
the content of that history would be ferociously debated. 
And furthermore, as post-socialist Ukrainian history and 
historiography develops, it will serve as a “laboratory” in 
which “the nation-state's conceptual hegemony” can be 
challenged (von Hagen 1995: 673). Similarly, today the
1. One of the US presenters took part via Skype video conference from 
Houston, Texas.
various disciplines that claim folklore in their purview— 
ethnomusicology, philology, ethnography, and, to a 
smaller extent, the institutionally marginalized fields of 
anthropology or “kulturolohia”(culturology)—contest 
the common intellectual terrain they inhabit on grounds 
both methodological and ideological.
These epistemological debates about value came 
into stark relief at the conference in L'viv, where three 
distinct perspectives on ethnography and ethnographic 
authority commingled: first, that of the the professional 
experts in the fields of folklore in Ukraine; second, my 
own, U.S. anthropology-inflected perspective (with 
all the concomitant reflexive positioning of myself 
as a member of the Ukrainian diaspora in the U.S., an 
ethnomusicology Ph.D. student and an ethnographer 
studying Ukraine)2; and third, the vantage points of two 
Hutsul “native ethnographers,” one the subject of my 
paper, the other, a Hutsul man studying the same subject 
as the one I had addressed. Before moving to the story of 
the remarkable manuscript that is the pivot in this schema 
of interacting ethnographic perspectives, I will provide a 
brief historical context for the divergent and sometimes 
contradictory ethnographic traditions that make up this 
triad.
On Ethnographic Authority and
Ethnomusicology in Ukraine
The disciplines of socio-cultural anthropology 
and, by association, ethnomusicology in the West have 
experienced a sea change in approaches and attitudes 
in recent decades, and the issue of the ethnographer's 
authority has been a central question in this upheaval. 
The post-colonial critique of anthropology and the social 
sciences pointed its finger at the colonialist, paternalistic, 
and ethnocentric origins of these disciplines, and the 
eruption of reactions that followed in U.S. and European 
academia ranged from profound to defensive, apologetic 
to deeply reflexive (Abu-Lughod 1991; Behar and Gordon 
1995; Clifford, Marcus, and School of American Research
2. As a teenager in the mid-1990s, I began to make solo trips to 
Ukraine, and went on my first team ethnomusicological expedition in 
1999 with a group from the L'viv Conservatory.
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1986; Sanjek 1990). Ethnomusicologist Steven Feld
proposed the strategy of “dialogic editing” to confront the 
issue of the ethnographer's authoritative impunity (Feld 
1987), when he brought his published ethnography back 
to the Kaluli of Papa New Guinea for their opinions and 
critique. Feld's authority was subjected to the represented 
population's authority, who then made their own role in 
the political act of constructing and representing subjects 
and stories (c.f. Jackson 1995). In a place like Ukraine, 
with its own firmly entrenched tradition of scholarship, 
an ethnographer dedicated to “dialogic editing” can 
choose to engage with the native population as well as to 
a third editing party: the professional experts in the local 
urban scholarly community.
Ukrainian ethnomusicology or folklore studies is 
a tradition of ethnography and analysis that has been, 
implicitly or explicitly, bound up in nationalist or 
essentialist dogma (Filenko 2001; Helbig 2005; Wanner 
1996). Rooted in Herderian nostalgia and Romantic 
striving for the authentic “soul of the folk,” transmuted 
through the confusing push-and-pull of Soviet formulae 
for socialist folklore, and now reinvented in the first 
tumultuous era of Ukrainian independence, contemporary 
Ukrainian ethnomusicological scholarship either goes so 
deep into formal structural analysis that it is impenetrable 
to outsiders, or becomes so explicitly political that any
claims towards objectivity are sullied. With the recent 
resurgence of xenophobic Ukrainian nationalism in its 
western regions, such polemical scholarship, affirmative 
of old models of nationalist-essentialist thought, despite 
the entirely different current political reality of Ukraine, 
will only further cleave contemporary Ukrainian society 
and reinforce the overly simplistic political rhetoric that 
pits fervent Western Ukrainian nationalists (Banderivtsi) 
against Russian chauvinists (Moskal'i) in the eastern and 
southern regions of Ukraine.
In post-Soviet Ukrainian ethnomusicology, 
professionals train by mastering rural repertoires and 
developing an ability to formalize, systematize and 
contextualize folk music along the indigenous guidelines 
of village rituals and beliefs. Given the piddling 
budgets allocated for this kind of research, Ukrainian 
ethnomusicologists generally study the “ethnographic 
regions” closest to their urban universities: L'vivan 
scholars focus on the Western Ukrainian groups such 
as Boykos, Lemkos, and Hutsuls; Kharkivan scholars 
focus on Eastern Ukrainian populations; Kyivans study 
Podilians and other Central Ukrainian “ethnographic 
groups.” Expeditions into the field are generally conducted 
over weekends or during weeks in the summer, and 
usually involve teams of researchers and students setting 
up camp in a village and fanning out in pairs or trios to
Ruslana and her “Wild Dancers” at Eurovision.
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find the eldest musicians in the community. The practice 
of extended fieldwork that marks ethnomusicology in the 
United States is not widely practiced.
In L'viv, ethnomusicologists conduct their interviews 
with musicians based on a checklist that runs through all 
of the possible ritual songs and cycles that local musicians 
may know. The checklist emphasizes “ancient” and 
“authentic” music: Soviet, contemporary or original songs 
do not make it onto the list. In the highly systematized 
task of preserving “authentic” musical repertoires and 
rituals that are perceived to be threatened or dying, 
the power of each individual researcher to interpret 
ethnographic data is limited by the overarching project 
of the collective, thereby, in some ways, skirting the 
question of ethnographic authority on an individual level. 
The all-encompassing project to salvage dying music, 
the central mission of Ukrainian folklore, does, however, 
bring an implicit set of assumptions about what kinds of 
music are valid and valuable (“authentic” and “forgotten” 
being at the top of the hierarchy, “original songs” and 
“Soviet era songs” at the bottom). Furthermore, formal 
interactions between ethnographers and song-carriers 
generally conform to the limited formula prescribed by 
the checklist and the specific question of the research— 
usually a variation on the question “what is the oldest and 
purest song of the specific sought-after genre?”
My own ethnographic research in Ukraine adhered to 
the model generally practiced in the United States. On a 
series of grants, I had the opportunity to live for extended 
periods in the communities that I studied. In addition to 
structured and systematic interviews, serendipity played 
a sizeable role in steering my research, and “deep hanging 
out” in informal gatherings resulted in some of my most 
compelling insights. My ethnomusicological interest 
in the Hutsuls centers on the ways that contemporary 
Ukrainian popular musicians look towards Hutsul culture 
as a kind of authentic folk id to the urban post-colonial 
Western Ukrainian superego. This stereotypical image of 
Hutsuls as the “wild” ethnic Ukrainians of the Carpathian 
mountains has had the biggest impact as a result of 
Ruslana's Wild Dances, which won the Eurovision grand 
prize in 2004, though numerous lesser known bands such 
as Haydamaky, Perkalaba, Gutsul Kalypso, Shokolad, 
and Drymba da Dzyga invoke Hutsul themes and imagery 
that construct variations on the theme of indigenous 
Ukrainian “wildness” as well.
These kinds of “wildness” are articulated not 
only through the proliferation of music that trades on 
such stereotypes, but also through the marketing of 
DVDs such as the “Wisdom of the Carpathian Shaman 
(Mol'far)” that follows the last surviving Hutsul shaman 
as he heals and casts spells, and the elaborate repertoire 
of “anekdoty” (jokes) about Hutsul “wildness.” All 
these forms of stereotyping and marketing of “wildness”
come from outside the Hutsul community: it is a 
newer formation of the old urban gaze onto the rural, 
analogous to the tired ethnomusicological paradigm that 
unproblematically imposes Western classical norms of 
transcription and description onto a music that confounds 
many basic principles of mode, meter, instrument design, 
and arrangement. For this reason, it was exceptional to 
come across, during my fieldwork in Verkhovyna, the 
remarkable manuscript written by an early twentieth- 
century Hutsul “native ethnographer” and activist whose 
work for over fifty years had been thought lost, and who 
was largely unknown to the professionals in L'viv.
The Remarkable Manuscript and the
Native Ethnographer's Voice
Summarizing the achievements of his friend and 
collaborator, Petro Shekeryk-Donykiv, the renowned 
Polish ethnographer, and writer Stanislaw Vincenz (1888­
1971) commented that “he was a talented person, if not a 
genius, and he made a work that, if they someday dig it 
up, will be the pride of native writing and a monument to 
the old language, to which there is no parallel” (quoted by 
Zelenchuk 2007 and Arsenych 2009). After nearly fifty 
years, the work to which Vincenz had referred was finally, 
and quite literally, dug up—physically exhumed from the 
soil, dusted off, wiped clean by the author's daughter— 
and presented to the editorial staff at Hutsulshchynna, 
the local press of the isolated Carpathian mountain town 
of Verkhovyna. In 2007, this small press released the 
forgotten magnum opus of the little-known author named 
Petro Shekeryk-Donykiv, who perished in the Soviet 
gulag in the early 1940s.
The remarkable history of this manuscript, published 
for the first time nearly half a century after the death 
of its author, is exceptional for the unlikelihood of its 
survival, but also disturbingly familiar as an example 
of the countless erasures attempted or accomplished by 
the Soviet regime. Three weeks after the last page of the 
loosely-autobiographical book was dated by Shekeryk- 
Donykiv (April 20, 1940), he was arrested by the 
NKVD and deported to Siberia, never to be heard from 
again. For the remainder of her life, his wife Paraska 
swore that his manuscripts, including the novel that 
was his masterpiece, had been destroyed. In truth, she 
and her daughter Anna buried the works, moving them 
occasionally, until “better times” came. Finally, in 1999, 
eight years after Ukraine declared independence from the 
Soviet Union, Anna brought the manuscript to the editors 
of the Hutsulschynna press in Verkhovyna, and they re­
assembled the novel from the partly-destroyed, partly- 
decayed original manuscript. The novel was finally 
published in 2007; the following year, the same press 




“A Year in the Ritual Life of the Hutsuls” (Shekeryk- 
Donykiv 2009, Shekeryk-Donykiv 2007).
Due to the limited number of copies published and 
the obscure and antiquated dialect in which the bulk of 
his work is written, the recently published materials of 
Shekeryk-Donykiv have had a limited impact in Ukraine. 
His work was, however, frequently cited as an important 
source material by Hutsul friends and informants during 
my fieldwork in Verkhovyna in the winter and spring 
of 2009. During the January 2009 winter holidays in 
Verkhovyna, my hosts would read aloud from Dido 
Ivanchyk to make sure they followed the correct 
Christmas dining procedures according to “old-world” 
Hutsul ritual. When all of the guests at the holy Christmas 
dinner were asked to climb under the food-laden table 
in turn, to shake its legs and shoo away demons, it was 
at Shekeryk-Donykiv's instruction. The book triggered a 
long-suppressed memory for the elderly matriarch, and, 
for the first time in decades, she carried freshly-baked 
loaves of braided bread into the snowy night to offer it to 
that year's deceased, as her mother had done in the 1930s.
My particular interest in Shekeryk-Donykiv centers 
on the impact of his work in reinstating forgotten rituals 
and kindling contemporary pride in ancient local custom, 
and extends to the importance of his role as a native 
ethnographer in a borderland on the periphery of various 
colonial urban loci of scholarship. Shekeryk-Donykiv's 
fundamental faith in the coherence of his native people's 
culture provides a counterpoint to the many better-known 
exoticized and romanticized literary and ethnographic 
accounts of Hutsul life by colonial and Ukrainian 
intellectuals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
(Kotsiubynsky 1981, Shukhevych 1899-1908, Ukrainka 
1973, Vincenz 1955, Witwicki 1873). For anthropologists 
of the Western tradition who have been concerned with the 
fundamental crisis of ethnographic authority in the wake 
of post-colonial critique, the discovery of a voice such 
as Shekeryk-Donykiv's is doubly interesting, because it 
provides an example of a “native ethnographer” from an 
era when “ethnography” in the United States was still 
in its very nascent formation. The evidence provided 
by a native ethnographer whose work was untouched 
by the Soviet censorship regime and unfiltered through 
contemporary post-colonial politics, offers a truly rare 
glimpse of the world which Shekeryk-Donykiv inhabited.
Petro Shekeryk-Donykiv was an extraordinary man 
born into extremely humble conditions in the mountain 
village of Holove near Zhab'ye (renamed Verkhvoyna in 
the Soviet 1960s) in 1889. He completed four years of 
primary school education in Holove. His teacher, Luka 
Harmatij, encouraged Shekeryk-Donykiv, his favorite 
student, to document his ethnographic observations, 
and presented him with a copy of Taras Shevchenko's 
Kobzar (the foundational text in Romantic Ukrainian
literature and politics), which had a big impact on the 
small boy. Through his teacher, Shekeryk-Donykiv 
became acquainted with many of the urban literati of the 
day—luminaries such as Ivan Franko, Hnat Khotkevych, 
Mykhailo Kotsiubynskij, Volodymyr Shukhevych—when 
they came to the mountains for respite or inspiration, 
and whom Shekeryk-Donykiv assisted in their folklore 
collecting endeavors.
During World War I, Shekeryk-Donykiv served in 
the Austrian army, where he agitated for the rights of 
Ukrainian speakers and encouraged his countrymen to take 
pride in the language and culture of Ukraine, despite its 
changing status as the colony of various shifting empires. 
His physical maturation came hand-in-hand with his full­
bodied and outspoken nationalism, and upon returning to 
his native land after the war, he actively participated in 
numerous social, cultural and political movements: the 
First Hutsul Theater company in Krasnoilya, the public 
educational and literacy organization Prosvita (Danilenko 
n.d.), the Ukrainian Nationalist Party (eventually as an 
elected deputy to its Rada in the 1930s), etc. He also 
worked tirelessly to combat illiteracy among the Hutsuls 
and was the founder and the chief editor of the annual 
Hutsul'skij Kalendar [Hutsul Calendar] which exists to 
this day. He was a prolific writer who published over 106 
works about the lives and beliefs of the Hutsuls in the 
1920-30s, in presses as far-reaching as Warsaw.
Dido Ivanchyk, Shekeryk-Donykiv's novel about the 
life of a Hutsul man, is written in the starovitzkij (lit. “old 
world”) Hutsul dialect. The story includes invaluable 
detail about the yearly rituals that marked life in the 
pre-Soviet Carpathian Mountains in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, including the complex intermarriage 
of pagan and animist beliefs with colonial forms of 
Christianity. This blurring of belief systems drives much 
of the action in the novel and results in a text that one 
reviewer referred to, anachronistically perhaps, as a self­
consciously literary “magical realism.” The collected 
works contain short essays in a folkloric-ethnographic 
vein, personal memoirs (including a history of the first 
Hutsul theater that Shekeryk-Donykiv assisted Hnat 
Khotkevych in founding and running), short stories based 
on local lore and legend, detailed explanation of the 
cyclical rituals and beliefs of the Hutsuls, opinion pieces, 
and humorous writings. Both works also contain rich 
descriptions of the role of music in the daily and spiritual 
lives of the Hutsuls, as a force for calling together the 
supernatural and the terrestrial through sound. As the 
bridge between the alternate belief systems of paganism 
and Christianity, music often serves to blend and blur 
the distinctions between animist and religious aspects of 
Hutsul faith in Shekeryk-Donykiv's work. Music is seen 
as a natural force that is god-given to selected (male) 
members of the community, special individuals who may
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possess mystical powers, such as the ability to manipulate 
the weather or create a trance in others through melody, 
sound, or vibration.
Shekeryk-Donykiv writes with a Hutsul voice (and in 
the Hutsul dialect) that pre-dates the Soviet imposition of 
politically-charged ethnography. With its rich descriptions 
of musical belief systems in the Hutsul worldview, his 
writing provides an instructive counterpoint from these 
outsider perspectives, and introduces the complex belief 
system that urbanites practicing a state-sanctioned 
version of religion would have identified as regressive and 
“wild.” As an example of a truly “native ethnographer,” 
Shekeryk-Donykiv's account of Hutsul life and ritual 
adds complexity to his authority as an interpreter of and 
expert on Hutsul life. It is a familiar conundrum for those 
who have reflected on the quintessential “outsiderness” of 
the individual who seeks to describe and interpret culture 
via the written word—even as a cultural insider. For an 
ethnographer like myself, such an authoritative voice 
from the past summons questions about the complex 
matrix of factors that Shekeryk-Donykiv must have 
weighed as he wrote the ethnography of his own people. 
How should I, the contemporary ethnographer, account 
for his biases as an insider with a political agenda? How 
does his ethnographic authority challenge or complement 
my own?
Coda: The Native Ethnographer's 
Ethnographers
In mid-October 2009, in the week following the 
conference, I traveled back to Verkhovyna and met 
with Vasyl Zelenchuk from the village of Kyvorivnia. 
Zelenchuk had completed his undergraduate degree in 
philology at Ivan Franko University in L'viv in the early 
1990s, but “fled back to the mountains” because city 
life felt confining to him. In Verkhovyna, he stood out 
as the local expert on Shekeryk-Donykiv, and assembled 
the dictionary of Hutsul terms that accompanied the 
publication of Dido Ivanchyk. As an undergraduate, he 
had studied demonology in the Hutsul belief system and 
was captivated by the figure of Shekeryk-Donykiv. He 
“knew in his heart” that the manuscript of Dido Ivanchyk 
still existed, and, in the late 1990s, he was the first to 
make a public announcement that the manuscript had 
been found. Zelenchuk assisted and guided the work's 
restoration through its publication in 2007. Zelenchuk's 
excitement about his research was contagious as 
he repeatedly mentioned his joy at meeting another 
individual interested in Shekeryk-Donykiv (and from 
America!). We sat at a small cafe table as I sipped the 
tea that I had ordered before he arrived and an hour flew 
by before we realized that, in his excitement, he had not 
paused to order a hot beverage, despite the fact that he
had come in soaked from a rainstorm.
I asked him about popular depictions of Hutsuls in 
Ukraine, and he commented on the “wildness” stereotype 
and the multiple reactions of Hutsuls to Ruslana's 
depiction (his village, Kryvorivnia, had spearheaded 
the attempt to boycott the album in Ukraine, expressing 
outrage at the term “wild” in the album title, though he 
was not involved). As we talked about representation of 
Hutsuls in popular music and ethnography, he revealed 
his extremely nuanced feelings about it: on the one hand, 
it's good to raise awareness of our existence, on the 
other hand, we don't deserve slander. He acknowledged 
the ambivalence of his own feelings on the subject of 
demonology, saying, “I know our superstitious beliefs 
are irrational, but some part of me still wants to and 
chooses to believe it.” He emphasized his commitment 
to speak his Hutsul dialect, though he admitted to shifting 
his language toward standard Ukrainian to communicate 
with me (though his speech was still heavily speckled with 
Hutsul words and his pronunciation was unmistakably 
Hutsul). We talked over key scenes in the recently 
published works of Shekeryk-Donykiv, and he offered 
interpretations of nuances that I had struggled to grasp.
Finally, it was time to face the rain again. As we 
stood up from the cafe table, Zelenchuk told me that our 
meeting had so energized him that he was impatient to 
return home to Shekeryk-Donykiv and maybe write a few 
pages himself. After we had parted, as I braced against 
the downpour with a flimsy umbrella, I considered the 
value of dialogue in the ethnographic process, the back- 
and-forth of simple conversation, the force of exchange 
in molding the texts that ethnographers make as we form 
our questions and assemble them in patterns that attempt 
to make some sense of the world. And in this very real, 
very current desire to deepen our knowledge, I marveled 
that an almost lost, nearly destroyed, ethnographer's 
voice could still induce such momentum—contained as it 
may be, but kinetic nonetheless—in the world.
I thank the Harriman Institute for their generous support of my 
travel to L'viv in mid-October 2009.
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Overcoming Warlords and State Failure: 
Lessons from Post-Soviet Georgia
O
n Wednesday, November 11, 2009, Kimberly 
Marten, Professor of Political Science at Bar­
nard College, Columbia University, spoke at the 
Harriman Institute about two Georgian warlords—Aslan 
Abashidze and Emzar Kvitsiani. Marten discussed their 
influence in Georgia, and the divergent approaches to­
wards warlordism taken by the administrations of Geor­
gian leaders Eduard Shevardnadze (1992-03) and Mikheil 
Saakashvili (2003-present).
Marten, who is writing a book on “Warlords, Sover­
eignty, and State Failure,” had just returned from Georgia, 
where she conducted 26 interviews with policy makers 
and analysts connected to these cases. Her findings were 
the basis for her presentation and will comprise a chap­
ter in her book. “Until now there have been ideographic 
studies of warlordism, but not a body of theory about the 
relationships between states and warlords. There is noth­
ing to indicate what happens when states take particular 
actions toward warlords.” Marten seeks to formulate this 
theoretical framework.
“I define warlords as individuals who control small 
slices of territory in defiance of state sovereignty, through 
the use of force and patronage.” Marten clarified that 
while warlords function against state interests, this does 
not exclude their cooperation with the state. Warlords can 
infiltrate the bureaucracy and often extend their patron­
age to the government. Warlords sometimes maintain 
control through clans. “The body of political science lit­
erature indicates that clans can form a parallel govern­
ment structure,” but as Marten continued, “clans are not 
as strong as the current literature suggests.” Saakashvili 
demonstrated that it was “easy to peel away clan support­
ers with promises of better conditions.”
Cases of warlordism can be observed across the globe, 
for example, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Chechnya, 
Iraq, and Somalia. The political economy of warlordism 
is similar across cases. Marten believes that Georgia is a 
particularly interesting case to examine, because of how 
differently two of its administrations have responded to 
warlords. While Shevardnadze accommodated the war­
lords' needs, in part because he felt intimidated and in part 
because he benefited from the connections, Saakashvili 
unseated these leaders and restored Georgia's sovereignty 
over their territories. “To my knowledge this is the only 
case in modern history where state leaders have dealt so 
differently with warlordism in the same country,” Marten 
noted. She added that Abashidze and Kvitsiani were what
she calls “middlemen” warlords, because they remained 
in power with Russian or Abkhazian support, operating 
between two states—Russia and Georgia.
Aslan Abashidze was a high-ranking official in both the 
Georgian and the Ajarian Communist parties until the fall 
of the Soviet Union. “This means that he had a lot of con­
nections with political figures emerging in the post-Sovi­
et space,” Marten said. In 1991, Abashidze was elected 
chairman of the Parliament of Ajara. Marten explained 
that his election was semi-legal. Georgia's first president, 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia, had pressured the chairman of the 
parliament to resign and then swayed the parliament to 
elect Abashidze. “While Abashidze's election was techni­
cally legal, it was actually an exercise of force.” Simulta­
neously Abashidze became deputy chairman of Georgia's 
national parliament and remained in this position for sev­
eral years.
Once Abashidze became chairman he formed his 
own militia and created a border separating Ajara from 
the rest of Georgia, forcing Georgian citizens to show 
their passports when they crossed the border, and stamp­
ing their passports with Ajaran “visas.” Using the civil 
war in Georgia as an excuse, Abashidze dissolved the 
parliament with an emergency decree. In response, local 
political leaders sent an open letter to Georgian authori­
ties, calling Abashidze's actions illegal. Nevertheless, 
Shevardnadze continued to accommodate the separat­
ist leader, treating him as an ally and helping him win 
elections through backdoor deals. Under Shevardnadze's 
presidency Abashidze was able to establish a separate 
National Security Council and Interior Ministry. He used 
these institutions to terrorize the population of Ajara. Ac­
cording to the Saakashvili government, he also ran a $100 
million narcotics smuggling ring, and appropriated the 
national oil taxes from the Batumi oil terminal.
Marten elaborated that oil would arrive in Batumi 
(Ajara's capital) via the Black Sea, where it would be 
transferred to rail cars. Abashidze would bribe Georgian 
Railway Ministry officials to say that all oil delivered 
through the railway was going beyond Georgian bor­
ders. Transit oil is supposed to be tax-free, but Abashidze 
would have customs officials collect taxes from the ship­
pers, and then keep the money in Ajara instead of sending 
it to state authorities. The oil would then be distributed 
within Georgia, instead of beyond its borders, following 
Abashidze's orders to the Railway Ministry. As a result
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Georgia lost over 60 percent of its oil tax revenue to 
Abashidze.
Shevardnadze also made electoral deals with 
Abashidze's Revival Party and allowed the Abashidze 
clan to control all government posts in Ajara. Marten in­
dicated that these electoral deals helped to provoke Geor­
gia's Rose Revolution in 2003. “In 2003, Shevardnadze 
announced that he would not run for reelection in 2005, 
and people were frightened,” Marten recounted, since it 
appeared that Shevardnadze had anointed Abashidze as 
his chosen successor. Abashidze secured a supposedly 
tremendous “official” electoral victory in 2003, but as 
independent exit polls showed, this victory was clearly 
fixed. As a result, people worried that once Shevard­
nadze's term came to an end, there would be another en­
gineering of elections in Abashidze's favor. “Georgians 
were scared that Abashidze would lead the country in 
Shevardnadze's place.”
The efforts of the Rose Revolution demonstrators in 
the fall of 2003 brought down Shevardnadze and replaced 
him with Saakashvili, who later was elected president 
in the snap election of January 2004. “Saakashvili had 
overwhelming popular support, even in Ajara,” remarked 
Marten. In response to the Rose Revolution, Abashid­
ze declared a state of emergency in Ajara, lashing out 
against protestors in the region. This immediately created 
a different dynamic between Saakashvili and Abashidze 
than the one that had existed between the warlord and 
Shevardnadze. Georgian officials and analysts as well 
as the international community feared there might be a 
military clash. At one point Abashidze stationed tanks on 
the Choloki Bridge, which separates Ajara from the rest 
of Georgia along the main highway. At another point he 
blew up the bridge, saying that he was preventing Geor­
gian forces from invading. Marten showed the audience 
a photograph of the bridge and the river below it; the river 
is actually quite shallow and narrow. “Standing on the 
bridge I realized that the majority of this situation was 
just theater; the Georgians could easily have sent forces 
and crossed the river.”
Abashidze was sent into exile in May 2004. The Geor­
gian government presented Saakashvili's victory over the 
warlord as a reflection of both the state's strength and the 
overwhelming popular support that Saakashvili and the 
Rose Revolution had generated. Among other pressure 
tactics, Saakashvili closed Ajara's airspace, blocked the 
Batumi Port, closed the Sarpi customs point and froze 
the bank accounts of Ajarian officials. Marten concluded 
that a full explanation for Saakashvili's success, however, 
also includes his ability to peel off Abashidze's support­
ers. “He didn't really make a clean sweep, but just dust­
ed off the furniture and rearranged it.” While the media 
dwelled on Saakashvili's hardliner tactics and popularity, 
there is more to the story. He “wooed a lot of Abashidze
supporters with promises of immunity from prosecution, 
allowing the wealthy to keep their wealth and political 
positions in exchange for donations to the state of Ajara.”
Abashidze was not punished—he has lived luxuri­
ously in Moscow since his exile. Saakashvili replaced 
him with Levan Varshalomidze, the son of Abashidze's 
former prime minister. He was installed without elec­
tions, and wields enormous power in Ajara on behalf of 
the Saakashvili regime. If Saakashvili had not wielded 
relatively authoritarian control over Ajara, he would have 
been unable to unseat Abashidze, since an independent 
judiciary might not have agreed to give immunity to his 
supporters and an independent electorate might not have 
wanted to see his supporters in political office. Further­
more, Saakashvili's tactics may not be applicable in states 
that lack developed bureaucracies and popular leaders, 
such as Afghanistan.
Marten described Emzar Kvitsiani as a “gang leader and 
jailbird” who controlled several of Abkhazia's casinos. 
He got his start as a separatist leader in 1993, during the 
Abkhazia-Georgia war, commanding a militia called the 
Monadire (“Hunter”). A number of Abkhazian refugees 
fled to Georgia proper through Kodori Gorge, a moun­
tainous region in Abkhazia that extends to the northeast 
from Sukhumi. Militias that may have included Kvitsiani 
supporters destroyed the road through the gorge, forc­
ing refugees to travel by foot and then demanding pay­
ment for their safe passage. The 1994 Moscow Ceasefire 
Agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia legitimized 
Kvitsiani's control over Upper Kodori, referring to that 
small area as a demilitarized zone where “local civil au­
thorities” would provide security. These authorities were 
the Monadire.
Shevardnadze did not try to confront Kvitsiani un­
til 1999, when he sent a delegation from Tbilisi to Up­
per Kodori. “The upper part of Kodori Gorge is difficult 
to reach—for eight months out of the year you can only 
get there by helicopter on clear days,” Marten explained. 
“Kvitsiani's militia greeted the delegation and then beat 
them up, shoving them back into the helicopter that 
brought them.”
During his reign Kvitsiani led a timber smuggling op­
eration that sent local lumber tax-free to Turkey through 
Abkhazia. He also had control over Tbilisi's electricity 
supply, holding hostage the high voltage power line that 
ran over Upper Kodori from Russia, and plunging Tbilisi 
into blackouts when he was unhappy with Shevardnadze. 
Shevardnadze paid Kvitsiani $50,000 a month in “hu­
manitarian aid” in return for the security of Tbilisi's elec­
tricity.
Saakashvili sought to change this situation. Two 
of his major advisors, Irakli Alasania, chairman of the 
Tbilisi-based Abkhazia-government-in-exile, and Irakli
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Okruashvili, the defense minister, disagreed about which 
path to take in dealing with the region, however. Alasa- 
nia wanted to reform the Monadire, while Okruashvili 
deemed the Monadire useless and wanted to implement 
armed police action and overthrow Kvitsiani.
In 2006 the Georgian government took militarized 
police action, sending troops into the mountains to over­
throw Kvitsiani. While a few Kvitsiani supporters shot 
at the Georgians, it is clear that there was an agreement 
made between the Georgian side and the Monadire to 
avoid major bloodshed. For example, it took 12-13 hours 
for the Georgian forces to drive up the mountains to Up­
per Kodori; the Monadire had clear sight lines, and could 
have laid mines on the road, but chose not to do so. “The 
Monadire melted away and the Georgian troops captured 
35 wanted criminals.” Marten speculates that this was the 
result of a similar type of deal to the one with Abashidze's 
clan.
Unlike the Abashidze deal, the agreement with Kvit- 
siani did not go according to plan. “Everyone I inter­
viewed told me that something in this deal went wrong, 
but no one knows what it was.” Kvitsiani was supposed to 
have stayed in Tbilisi, but instead he went back to Kodori. 
There was not supposed to be shooting from Kvitsiani's 
side, but there was some shooting from a small number 
of his supporters. After the raid, Kvitsiani managed to es­
cape, and some say the Abkhaz had agreed to jail him but 
did not. “My understanding is that if the deal had gone 
properly, Kvitsiani would be in Tbilisi or perhaps impris­
oned right now.” There is speculation that when the au­
thorities could not get Kvitsiani, they captured his sister 
Nora and imprisoned her instead. “There were people far 
guiltier than Nora and this appears to have been a sym­
bolic move, because the authorities couldn't get Kvit- 
siani,” Marten noted.
After Georgia regained control of this small section 
of Abkhazia, Saakashvili moved the Abkhazia govern­
ment-in-exile from Tbilisi to Kodori Gorge, and pledged 
to spend $10 million per year from the state budget on re­
construction, in order to make the area a showcase for the 
rest of Abkhazia and attract Abkhazians back into Geor­
gia's fold. Reconstruction efforts had actually started in 
summer 2005, when Kvitsiani was living in Tbilisi, and 
appear to have been part of the effort to woo Kvitsiani's 
supporters. These expenditures would likely not have 
been possible if real democratic debate were allowed 
in Georgia, since at this time the entire social services 
budget of Georgia was only $350 million per year, and 
the country is burdened by poverty, unemployment, and 
healthcare and education systems that are in great need 
of reform. Georgian authorities also deployed U.S.-made 
weapons in the region.
These gestures, alongside Saakashvili's claim that 
he was making the new “Upper Abkhazia” a showcase, 
aggravated relations with Russia and contributed to the 
tensions leading to the 2008 war. “Saakashvili's biggest 
mistake was in pulling the tail of the tiger,” Marten con­
tended. Upper Kodori was retaken by Russian-supported 
Abkhaz forces in the war, in a move that was clearly coor­
dinated with actions in South Ossetia. Meanwhile Kvit- 
siani is rumored to be living freely in Abkhazia.
Marten concluded that “the message to learn from 
these cases is that warlords themselves are pretty expend­
able.” Their supporters can be easily peeled away by a 
strong state, and as middlemen they may be useful for 
protecting realist power interests, but are not worth going 
to war over. “Russia was not interested in the individu­
als,” Marten said. “What went wrong in Upper Kodori 
was probably that Saakashvili pushed too hard.” What 
Saakashvili demonstrated, though, is that success in deal­
ing with warlords may be easiest for a state that is not a 
liberal democracy.
Reported by Masha Udensiva-Brenner
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The Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan: 
Affecting Factors and Priorities
A
t a forum cosponsored by Columbia University's 
Harriman Institute, and the Center for Energy, 
Marine Transportation and Public Policy, Elmar 
Mammadyarov stressed that the resolution of the Arme­
nian-Azeri conflict was his first, second, and third priority 
as Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, “You can imagine that 
when you have almost 20 percent of your territory under 
occupation, and when you have almost a million of your 
people internally displaced by refuges from Armenia, it 
will have a very serious impact on determining foreign 
policy priorities,” Mr. Mammadyarov remarked.
Azerbaijan and Armenia have been in dispute over 
the Nagorno-Karabakh region for several centuries. 
The tensions between them most recently culminated in 
March 2008, with a breach of the Bishkek Truce, a cease­
fire agreement signed in 1994. The Nagorno-Karabakh 
Republic (NKR) is not recognized by any country ex­
cept Armenia. Although it is technically a part of Azer­
baijan, the so-called NKR is essentially an extension of 
Armenian influence. Until recently, Azerbaijan lacked 
the military strength to reclaim the disputed territory, but 
with the rapid growth of its economy from oil revenues, 
the country has raised defense expenditures significantly 
over the past four years. A stronger military has shifted 
the balance of power in Azerbaijan's favor, raising ten­
sions in the region. According to Mammadyarov, Azer­
baijan's GDP, which has been increasing steadily over 
recent years, has grown by 4 percent, even in the midst of 
the international financial crisis.
In response to a question about President Ilham Ali­
yev's “aggressive comments about solving the conflict 
through military means,” Mammadyarov affirmed: “I ab­
solutely do not believe that it's a frozen conflict. If you 
look through internet sources, you will see that there have 
been soldiers and civilians killed.”
The moderator, Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich, 
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor for the Prac­
tice of International Diplomacy at Columbia University, 
made the comment that it was a “general view that Presi­
dent Aliyev has referred more frequently to the possible 
recourse to a military outcome in the future,” and asked if 
the escalation of military rhetoric was “an intended effort 
to try to dramatize the issue,” or if we were mistaken in 
seeing it as such. In response, Mammadyarov pointed to 
a document signed by Azerbaijan's President Aliyev, Ar­
menia's President Sargsyan, and Russia's President Med­
vedev, saying that this declaration clearly demonstrates 
that the parties are looking for a political solution. He 
summed up his position as being that Azerbaijan has not 
“exhausted diplomatic means... but on the other hand, 
they cannot accept the status quo.”
At the mention of President Medvedev's involve­
ment in the peace process, Sestanovich noted that Rus­
sia has become one of the most active participants in the 
negotiations, although peace may not actually be on its 
agenda: “Over the years there have been times when the 
parties and other governments wondered whether Russia 
was really interested in a settlement of this kind,” the Am­
bassador said, “The argument,” Sestanovich continued, 
“was that Russia benefited from perpetuation of a conflict 
and particularly from a close relationship with Armenia 
that was the result of that. Do you believe that the Russian 
view is completely committed to a conflict?” he asked the 
Minister. Mammadyarov responded that Azerbaijan ap­
preciates President Medvedev's involvement in the peace 
process, and that the President has even drafted parts of 
the document himself. “Well that's always a bad sign,” 
Ambassador Sestanovich said, laughing: “I teach this 
in my diplomacy class, when presidents start drafting, 
watch out.” Mammadyarov did not laugh, asserting that 
President Medvedev's involvement shows “dedication on 
the highest level to find a breakthrough in negotiations.” 
Sestanovich nodded in agreement.
One source of skepticism regarding Russia's true 
interests stems from its conflict with Georgia over the 
separatist region South Ossetia. In February 2008, many 
Western countries supported Kosovo in its declaration of 
independence from Serbia. Russia, which did not have 
the West's support over South Ossetia, warned that sup­
port for Kosovo's independence would lead to unrest in 
other areas with breakaway regions. A conflict between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan would validate the country's 
prediction, and if Nagorno-Karabakh is successful in se­
ceding, would set another precedent for South Ossetia's 
independence.
Mammadyarov indicated that Azerbaijan seeks the 
normalization of relations with all its neighbors, and that 
a withdrawal of Armenian troops, along with sending dis­
placed persons home, should be the first step. “We be­
lieve, we strongly believe, that taking into consideration 
the ongoing processes in the world, a higher level of au­
tonomy within Azerbaijan, for Nagorno-Karabakh, where
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both the Armenian and Azeri communities can peacefully 
co-exist, can be the most important factor of stability for 
the whole region,” he concluded.
The Minister mentioned his current negotiations with 
the Foreign Minister of Armenia, and said that there have 
already been at least six meetings between Presidents 
Aliyev and Sargsyan. There is to be another presidential 
meeting soon, where the two countries can finalize the 
“so-called basic principles,” a step-by step approach to­
wards a comprehensive peace agreement.
Mammadyarov declared that a peace agreement is 
essential—“it will create the most important thing: pre­
dictability.” The Minister elaborated on his reference to 
predictability by stressing Azerbaijan's strategic geo­
graphic location. He described the country as “the con­
nection between East and West, North and South,” af­
firming Azerbaijan's crucial role in geopolitics and the 
stability of the region.
Mammadyarov then took up other foreign policy is­
sues. He focused on Azerbaijan's ample natural resources 
and its involvement in various pipeline projects. Noting 
Sestanovich's involvement in the negotiations of the Ba- 
ku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the Minister emphasized that 
the participation of the United States had been key to the 
project's success. This pipeline, developed in the 1990s 
under the Clinton Administration, and completed in 2006, 
has greatly increased Azerbaijan's wealth.
A major issue for Azerbaijan has been its potential 
involvement with the Nabucco pipeline. If built, the Na- 
bucco pipeline will be the longest and largest pipeline to 
carry gas from the Caspian Sea and the Middle East to 
Europe, going through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Hungary. This is another area where Russia has played a 
role, and where the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has 
affected Azerbaijan's foreign policy decisions. Azerbai­
jan was geared to provide oil for the Nabucco pipeline. In 
January, Russian media outlets released news of a hefty 
arms transfer from Russia to Armenia. This move would 
help counterbalance Azerbaijan's strengthening military. 
Russia denied transfer allegations, but there is specula­
tion that this was a message sent in order to hinder Azer­
baijan's participation in Nabucco. If realized, Nabucco 
will significantly reduce Europe's dependence on Rus­
sian gas.
Russia has made other moves to block the Nabucco 
project. In February, President Medvedev signed a docu­
ment, entitled “Strategy of National Security of the Rus­
sian Federation up to 2020,” which mentions the impor­
tance of the Caspian region for Russia's energy security. 
Analysts have interpreted the appearance of this docu­
ment in the midst of Nabucco negotiations as a warning 
of Russia's intent to thwart the project. Azerbaijan was 
supposed to be one of Nabucco's major suppliers, but in 
March, the country signed a “Memorandum of Mutual
Understanding” with Gazprom, committing to ship an 
unspecified amount of gas to Russia in 2010. Rumor sug­
gests that Azerbaijan will not have enough gas to supply 
both Russia and Nabucco.
Mammadyarov observed, “Although Azerbaijan is 
not part of this pipeline, it's a huge project. We are not 
standing for politicization of commercial projects, but 
political aspects are a very strong element.” In light of 
Mammadyarov's comment that Azerbaijan would not be 
participating in Nabucco, an audience member was inter­
ested to know how the Minister felt about possibilities of 
Azerbaijan contributing, given the high demand for Azeri 
gas from both Russia and Nabucco officials. The Min­
ister responded that from one point of view, Azerbaijan 
is not a part of Nabucco, “but on the other hand, we are 
negotiating with representatives of Nabucco, with the Eu­
ropean Commission.” There are three issues concerning 
Nabucco, the Minister said: political, financial, and the 
matter of volume (where to obtain the gas). “Everything 
is up in the air,” he said, but mentioned that taking into 
account Azerbaijan's offshore field Shah Deniz, they are 
ready to work with Nabucco, depending on the resolution 
of certain questions: how to finance, tariffs, and manner 
of transport. Dealing with gas is trickier, he said, because 
unlike oil, it is a product that must go directly to consum­
ers, and they must determine a way to do that for such a 
large pipeline.
An audience member inquired whether Azerbaijan 
has any strategic preference on aligning with Russia ver­
sus the European Union. Mammadyarov responded that 
Azerbaijan will go with whoever provides the best price.
Sestanovich followed with a question about the pos­
sible obstacles to the Nabucco project, and what advice 
the Minister would give to the U.S. and the E.U. on push­
ing the project forward. “As usual you are asking very 
provocative questions,” Mammadyarov responded, “I 
should be last in line to give advice to the U.S. admin­
istration or the European Union,” he said. Ambassador 
Sestanovich jokingly replied, “If you're not giving advice 
to the U.S. administration on your visit here, then you are 
not doing your job.”
The Minister responded by recounting the experi­
ence with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and how if 
the Nabucco pipeline was handled in the same manner 
it could be the next “Great Deal of the Century.” Sesta- 
novich intervened, “O.K., I can translate that,” he said, 
“that means that the United States has to be more actively 
involved in promoting this, because if you ask me how 
to read the lesson of the nineties, it was that the Ameri­
can administration got behind the project and at certain 
points, when some people were less enthusiastic, the 
United States kept pushing forward.” Minister Mammad- 
yarov responded by saying that the current administration 
is almost the same energy team as in the nineties, “I think
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that if we move correctly and consistently in how we 
should build up the strategy and architecture to achieve 
the global delivery of gas to the European market, I can­
not exclude that we can't get success.”
Mammadyarov also discussed the construction of a 
railroad connecting Baku, Tbilisi and the Turkish city of 
Kars, an exciting economic project for Azerbaijan outside 
of the gas sphere. The Minister called this railroad “the 
next Silk Road,” adding that that there were plans to re­
habilitate part of the Georgian railroad. “This will be part 
of an effort to strengthen Azerbaijan's sovereignty,” he 
said. The project might be good for Azerbaijan because 
of the latest tensions with Turkey over its reconciliation 
with Armenia.
Sestanovich asked Mammadyarov about his conver­
sations with Turkish officials concerning the reconcilia­
tion, which was announced this spring. Turkey, which has 
its own tensions with Armenia, and has been a supporter 
of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, clos­
ing its borders to Armenia from 1993 to the present day, 
intends to normalize relations with the country, despite 
Azerbaijan's apparent anxiety over the matter.
The Ambassador inquired about the Turkish For­
eign Minister's recent assurance that Turkey will not 
disappoint Azerbaijan, and wondered what other kinds 
of assurances the Azeris have received from Turkey. In 
response, Mammadyarov stressed Azerbaijan's gratitude 
towards Turkey for closing its borders in ‘93. He said that 
Azerbaijan supports Turkey's reconciliation with Arme­
nia, “We recognize the sovereign right of any country to 
build up relationships with other countries.”
Sestanovich probed further, “As a foreign diplomat 
I know your job is to say only what you want to say, and 
my job as the moderator is to see how much I can push 
you. So let me push you further, have you received assur­
ances from Turkey?” The Minister responded that Turkey 
has promised not to open borders to Armenia until the 
country withdraws its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh.
Aside from Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan's 
energy policy, the matter of human rights was stressed 
during the forum. Currently two Azeri political bloggers, 
arrested for an altercation in a Baku restaurant in July, are 
in prison on charges of hooliganism. The bloggers had 
become well-known for criticizing the Azeri government 
and there is speculation that political issues stand behind 
the charges of disorderly conduct. The Azeri authorities 
dismiss accusations that the arrest had any political moti­
vations. However, journalists have been banned from at­
tending the trial, which started earlier this September, on 
grounds of insufficient seating, and the two bloggers have 
not been permitted to see their families.
A representative of the organization Reporters With­
out Borders, asked the Minister what he thought about
freedom of press in Azerbaijan, given the context of the 
bloggers. “If you look at how severely I am criticized by 
newspapers in Azerbaijan you will see that there is free­
dom of press. If the court makes a bad decision, you can 
apply to the other court,” Mr. Mammadyarov responded.
A Human Rights Watch representative commented, 
“The information we have is that activists were attacked 
unprovoked and then put in detention, this seems harsh,” 
and asked what the Azeri government would do to make 
sure they got a fair trial. The Minister responded that the 
assumption of unfair treatment and the accusation that the 
trial will be unjust is a pre-judgment made by taking the 
issue out of the larger framework, “You are only picking 
one particular case from a larger context. You can find 
these types of cases even in more advanced democra­
cies,” he said. When asked a more specific question about 
the treatment of the bloggers and his plans on responding 
to foreign criticism, the Minister said, “Honestly speak­
ing; I am not closely following the case.”
The Obama administration's announcement last 
week that it was changing its approach to missile defense 
against the possible Iranian ballistic missile threat, was 
one of the final points brought to the table by Ambassador 
Sestanovich. He asked for the Minister's feelings on the 
recent decision to switch from long-range missiles to fo­
cus more seriously on short- and medium-range missiles, 
and wondered whether Azerbaijan had been approached 
by the United States government to participate in such a 
program, and in what ways, if at all, would the country be 
prepared to do so.
Mammadyarov responded, “At the end of the story 
it's very important to find out how the United States is 
going to build their strategy with regard to anti-missile 
defense. Yes, we were informed throughout the negotia­
tions by Russia and by the United States in regards to 
the Qabala Radar Station.” The Qabala Radar Station 
was built by the Soviet Union in Azerbaijan in 1985. In 
light of Obama's recent missile decision, Russia and the 
United States have contemplated possible joint use of the 
radar station. The Minister said that the Azeris knew of 
the decision even before it was announced, and that Azer­
baijan was ready to negotiate in regards to its contribution 
to nuclear nonproliferation.
Sestanovich asked if Azerbaijan has been approached 
strictly in regards to Qabala, or if the country was asked 
to participate in other ways, to which Mammadyarov re­
sponded that so far the discussions have been limited to 
Qabala.
Reported by Masha Udensiva-Brenner
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An Overview of U.S.-Russia Relations
“Let me say that it's nice to be home,” pronounced Mr. 
Ian C. Kelly, Department Spokesman and former Direc­
tor of the Office of Russian Affairs at the U.S. Depart­
ment of State, and an alumnus of Columbia University. 
“For me, the Harriman Institute was kind of a home away 
from home,” he expressed, recalling how he had written 
his Ph.D. dissertation in the basement of the library, com­
ing up to the Institute whenever he wanted “a sense of 
community, and a place to unwind and have stimulating 
discussions.” Kelly discussed the relationship between 
Russia and the United States at a Harriman-sponsored 
lecture on September 29, 2009.
“I would like to break my remarks into three sec­
tions,” Kelly began. “Why it is that the Obama admin­
istration thinks that Russia matters; in what areas do we 
have good cooperation with Russia; and on what areas 
don't we agree?” Kelly stressed Russia's position as the 
largest country in the world, which, “sits on top of three 
regions vital to our interests: Europe, the Middle East, and 
Northeast Asia. Areas from which the Obama administra­
tion faces some of its biggest challenges,” he remarked.
Why Russia Matters
According to Kelly, a good relationship with Russia 
is crucial, because it can help the United States to meet 
the challenges it faces. Russia has a permanent seat on the 
Security Council, which makes it a key player in helping 
to address the problems of both Iran and North Korea. 
Most importantly the United States needs Russia's help 
on issues of non-proliferation. “Obama has made non­
proliferation a signature issue for this administration, and 
he wants to make it the goal of not only the U.S., but 
also the international community, to have a world with­
out nuclear weapons. This can't happen without Russia's 
cooperation,” Kelly affirmed, noting that together Russia 
and the U.S. hold 95% of the world's nuclear weapons. 
Kelly articulated the Obama administration's decision to 
restructure the relationship with Russia through engage­
ment on certain issues. He also commented on the ob­
stacles the two countries will face, “I don't want to leave 
you with the impression that there won't be challenges in 
the U.S.-Russia relationship—we come at issues very dif­
ferently. This is because in many ways we have a differ­
ent world view, different geography, different history, and 
a different culture, but we have to cooperate,” he urged. 
“From my time on the Russia desk, I know that Russia 
feels comfortable with a bilateral structure. It is in our in­
terest to engage them in a sustained way on issues that are
important to us,” Kelly pronounced. He commented that 
this tactic is a good way to “jump-start relations” after the 
tension over the Georgia conflict in August 2008.
Bilateral Presidential Commission
President Obama went to Moscow for three days in 
July and during this visit the two governments agreed 
to create a bilateral presidential commission. Presidents 
Obama and Medvedev will be the chairs of the com­
mission and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (who is 
Mr. Kelly's direct boss), and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sergei Lavrov, will be the commission's coordinators. 
The commission is to start in mid-October of 2009. The 
agenda will include: nuclear energy, nuclear security, 
arms control, counter terrorism, drug trafficking, busi­
ness development, energy and the environment, science 
and technology, educational and cultural exchange, and 
“civil society,” Kelly explained that this latter term was 
“what the two countries have agreed to call matters of 
human rights.”
Areas of Good Cooperation
Afghanistan. Moving to the second section of his 
talk— the issues on which Russia and the U.S. have good 
cooperation, Kelly communicated that “Afghanistan, 
more than any other issue, is where we really converge.” 
He indicated that “Russia wants the U.S. and the interna­
tional community to succeed in Afghanistan,” mention­
ing Russia's solid national interest to ensure that Afghani­
stan does not return to its former status as a safe haven for 
international terrorists and religious extremists, and its 
determination to curb narcotics trafficking. Kelly stated 
that Russia and the U.S. have good programs of coopera­
tion to counter narcotics, with a center in Domodedovo, 
outside of Moscow, where they have trained Afghan po­
lice. “Russians sent trainers to locations in Central Asia,” 
Kelly noted, “not to Afghanistan though, there is still 
some sensitivity about Russians in uniform in Afghani­
stan,” he laughed.
Russian Airspace. Besides the announcement of 
the bilateral commission, “the other big announcement 
in July was the news that Russia is willing to allow the 
transit of lethal material through its airspace,” Kelly re­
marked. “They hadn't allowed that before. They had al­
lowed other types of material, but not weapons and am­
munition,” he stated, adding that the first flight took place 
last week.
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North Korea. “We have real solid consensus with 
Russia on confronting the North Korea problem,” Kelly 
affirmed, noting that Russia “shares our commitment 
to the ultimate goal of a verifiable denuclearization of 
North Korea.” Russia has cooperated to draft and pass 
“one of the most robust Security Council resolutions,” 
noted Kelly, referring to UN resolution 1874, which was 
adopted by the UN Security Council on June 12th. This 
resolution was passed in response to underground nuclear 
testing conducted by North Korea at the end of May. It 
imposes additional economic and commercial sanctions 
on the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea 
(DPRK) and asks UN member states to search North Ko­
rean cargo. “It has some real teeth in it in terms of non­
proliferation,” Kelly said.
Bilateral Arms Agreement. Efforts towards a new 
bilateral arms agreement represent another area of coop­
eration. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), 
ratified by the United States and the former Soviet Union 
in 1991, is due to expire on December 5th. START I is 
the largest nuclear reduction treaty in history, stipulat­
ing that each country could deploy no more than 6,000 
nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles. 
The two counties reached the stipulated goals in 2001. 
Currently the governments have agreed on the common 
goal of nuclear weapon reduction far below the numbers 
in the START I agreement. “It will be a real challenge for 
us to get a treaty ratified by December 5th,” Kelly said, 
“but there has been real impetus to do so.”
Kelly praised the Cooperative Threat Reduction pro­
gram (CTR), noting that this bilateral working group has 
stayed “under the radar.” Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) 
and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) initiated the CTR in response 
to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The collapse left 
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus in possession 
of all Soviet nuclear weapons and this program aims to 
help the republics dismantle or safely store the weapons 
in the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Kelly related that the United 
States has done a lot to help Russia contain its nuclear 
weapons and to provide a monitoring system. “When I 
was working on the Russia desk last year, during that re­
ally low point in U.S.-Russian relations, a lot of bilat­
eral cooperation stopped, but the Nunn-Lugar agreement 
went on,” he remarked.
Missile Defense. “Probably the most dramatic turn­
around has been in missile defense,” Kelly asserted. “It 
was perhaps the most contentious issue that we faced 
both in my time at NATO and my time on the Russia 
desk.” He reported that “no matter how hard we tried to 
convince the Russians that our plans to put radar stations 
in Poland weren't a threat to them, the Russians never 
bought it.” Kelly speculated that the bilateral nature of 
the radar stations was one of the main reasons for Rus­
sia's discomfort. “A lot of our NATO allies didn't like
the bilateral aspect,” he said, noting that the allies would 
have preferred the stations to be set up in the context of 
NATO. He also believes that Russia was unhappy with 
the “permanence” of these missile stations.
Kelly expressed his opinion that Russia “could not 
have really been afraid of ten interceptors, given the thou­
sands of warheads and delivery vehicles that they had.” 
He reasoned that the Russian government most likely 
felt vulnerable to the potential of a future technologi­
cal breakthrough “that would undermine their strategic 
nuclear deterrence forces.” To ease Russia's discomfort, 
“the President has decided on a more mobile and adap­
tive system that doesn't target intercontinental ballistic 
missiles but confronts a more real problem, the threat of 
medium-range missiles,” remarked Kelly, explaining that 
the new system was designed to counter the medium- 
range missiles recently tested in Iran. Kelly added that 
the U.S. wanted to cooperate with Russia “even under 
the Bush administration.” He said that the United States 
had looked for a way the two countries can link up their 
systems. Kelly thinks that since “we have dealt with some 
of these problems of mistrust,” the two countries can 
strengthen cooperation efforts.
Areas of Friction
Georgia. “As for the areas where we encounter fric­
tion,” Kelly continued, “they are for the most part legacy 
issues from previous administrations.”
To begin with, Kelly voiced the administration's 
strong belief that every country should have the freedom 
to choose its own alliances. “No country has the right to 
veto security alliances of other countries,” he affirmed. 
Kelly also stressed American support for Georgia's sov­
ereignty and territorial integrity, “We will take every op­
portunity to reiterate that.” An audience member asked 
Kelly if he would consider the military presence in Geor­
gia an occupation. “Occupation is a loaded term and I 
think I will avoid it,” said Kelly, adding that there is a 
process in place geared towards resolving the issue. “We 
are still very concerned about the potential for more con­
flict in the southern Caucasus,” he continued, mention­
ing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia. “We have to keep our eye on that ball, but 
there are a lot of balls we need to keep our eye on,” Kelly 
laughed. He noted that there was a great deal of diplo­
matic research behind the Geneva talks this year.
Human Rights. Another point of contention between 
Russia and the U.S. has been Russia's unfortunate hu­
man rights record. “Human rights continue to be an area 
where we fundamentally disagree, we're very forthright 
about it,” Kelly said, noting Obama's statements in Mos­
cow about the Russian administration's failure to punish 
violence against human rights activists and journalists. 
Kelly voiced the administration's disapproval at the lack
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of freedom in Russian electronic media, which he said is 
“if not censored, then very much controlled by the gov­
ernment.” He added that the United States will engage 
Russia on these issues in the context of the new bilateral 
commission on civil society. “We will offer to help where 
we can,” he said.
“We also have an area where our interests both con­
verge and diverge,” Kelly said, “and that area is Iran.” 
Both countries agree that “it would be very destabilizing 
if Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon, but our points 
of view diverge on how to approach that,” noted Kelly. 
Prime Minister Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov have 
both criticized the economic sanctions approach, advo­
cating instead for engagement. The Bush administration 
favored isolation. The Obama administration proposes a 
dual track; it is serious about engagement, but needs to be 
ready for other approaches if engagement fails.
Question and Answer
Strategic Partnership. Columbia Economics Profes­
sor Padma Desai, asked Kelly if the United States was 
headed towards a strategic partnership with Russia, and 
whether he thought this partnership would survive if Pu­
tin were to become president in 2012. Kelly responded, 
“The term strategic partnership has a certain meaning in 
diplomatic parlance, we say that we have one with India, 
Japan, Australia, the E.U. We're not quite there with Rus­
sia, not to say that we won't get there.... Our relationship 
with Russia needs some remedial work. We are trying to 
integrate Russia into the broader community of democra­
cies and anchor them in rules-based organizations.” As 
for Putin, Kelly indicated that he has done a lot for Rus­
sia: “He was a natural successor to Boris Yeltsin, because 
he recognized that Russia had perceived itself to be very 
weak and he performed a real service to his country.” 
Kelly feels that Putin's choice to appoint Medvedev as 
his successor is an indication of his awareness that Rus­
sia needs a new kind of leader. “Whether or not [Putin] is 
completely comfortable with going off into the sunset, is 
a different matter,” Kelly concluded.
NATO. Kelly mentioned Russia's perception that 
NATO is its antagonist, and stressed that while this was 
true for NATO pre-1989, “its members now see it as 
something very different—it is the transatlantic commu­
nity where we get together to face common challenges.” 
Kelly contends that he has “taken every opportunity to 
tell Russia—that it is because of NATO that you have the 
most secure western borders you've ever had in your his­
tory,” arguing that countries which were historically Rus­
sia's opponents, and have joined NATO, “have agreed to 
pool their security in a multilateral context.”
Kelly referred to the removal of the Bronze Soldier 
monument in Tallinn in April 2007, using the circum­
stances as an example of NATO's assistance in conflict
resolution between Russia and another nation. The monu­
ment commemorated the Soviet victory in World War II, 
and its dislodgement caused mass protests in Estonia, in­
tensifying the country's tensions with Russia. Estonia, a 
member of NATO, allowed NATO to handle the conflict, 
“I think that this really diffused the situation,” Kelly said.
Latin America. When asked how he felt about Rus­
sia's relationship with Latin America, Kelly answered, 
“At the time we saw it for what it was, a shot across our 
bow.” He was referring to Russia's announcement, in the 
wake of the Georgia conflict last September, that it would 
hold joint military ventures with Venezuela, and to Presi­
dent Medvedev's meeting with Hugo Chavez last No­
vember, the first visit of any Russian leader to Venezuela. 
These moves were seen by the United States as an attempt 
by Russia to revert to cold-war era tactics. Kelly observed 
that while there has recently been less military coopera­
tion between Russia and Venezuela, he is concerned that 
“Venezuela is arming itself in a way that goes far beyond 
immediate arms needs.” Russia has extended a $2.2 bil­
lion loan to the country in order to purchase tanks and 
advanced anti-aircraft missiles earlier this month.
Jackson-Vanik. When asked about the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment, Kelly called it a “dinosaur and an albatross 
around our necks.” The amendment was signed into law 
in 1975 in response to the Soviet Union's refusal to al­
low people, mostly Jews and other religious minorities, to 
emigrate to the United States. It forbids most favored na­
tion status to non-market economies with restricted emi­
gration, and still applies to Russia, among other nations, 
even though many consider emigration to be a dated is­
sue. The amendment has been a point of tension between 
Russia and the United States, and Kelly voiced hopes to 
eradicate it. “It might be possible with this congress,” he 
conveyed, “but we need to wait a little while, we have 
other priorities with congress right now.”
Resetting Relations. Responding to an accusation 
that the administration has been willing to reset relations 
with Russia without Russia trying to reset its political 
system, Kelly alluded to engagement of Russia as “an 
across-the-board decision by this administration.” Kelly 
pronounced that the previous administration's policies 
of isolation and criticism, “were leading us nowhere, not 
just with Russia, but with Iran and North Korea as well.” 
He declared that the United States will continue to speak 
out against policies they do not agree with, but that it can 
have more influence by engaging with Russia.
A student and Russian citizen made the comment, 
“It is not surprising to anyone that the Russian adminis­
tration uses international questions to deal with internal 
problems, taking up issues such as missile defense to con­
vince its people that the United States is the enemy, what 
do you think about this?” Kelly replied that President 
Obama has been trying to tackle this issue by appealing
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directly to the Russian people. “One of the reasons that 
President Obama spent so much time in Russia,” Kelly 
commented, “was because he wanted to speak to univer­
sities, to appear on Russian television.”
Kosovo. Gordon Bardos, Assistant Director of the 
Harriman Institute, addressed Kelly, as “an old Bal­
kan hand,” commenting on the United States' decision 
not to cooperate with Russia about Kosovo. “I think we 
can agree that this was a foreign policy blunder by the 
United States. Two-thirds of the international community 
supported Moscow on this; it seems that strategically it 
would have been better to work out a deal with Moscow. 
Why did we do it?” Bardos asked. “This was a tremen­
dously controversial decision,” replied Kelly. “It played 
into the Russians' instincts that they weren't taken seri­
ously.” He recalled being at NATO when the decision was 
made, “I remember thinking that this was not going to 
end too well. I was also thinking we couldn't let it fester,” 
adding that the best strategy for the time being was to 
encourage Belgrade “to see its future with the E.U.”
Conclusion. Kelly concluded his talk by commend­
ing Medvedev's recent remarks, which recognized Rus­
sia's over-reliance on extractive industries. “Russia needs 
to put more investment into its own people, into educa­
tion and training. In order to succeed in the 20th century, 
you can't rely solely on natural resources,” stated Kelly.
Reported by Masha Udensiva-Brenner
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